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THE QUESTION FOR ANOTHER DAY: HOOKER V. ILLINOIS
STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS AND ITS EFFECT ON THE VITALITY
OF CITIZEN BALLOT INITIATIVES AND REDISTRICTING REFORM
IN ILLINOIS
THOMAS Q. FORD *
INTRODUCTION
Gerrymandering—the practice of manipulating the boundaries of an
electoral district to favor one party’s candidate over another—is nothing
new. The tactic dates back more than 200 years, to our country’s first Congressional election. 1 In 1788, founding father Patrick Henry tried to keep his
political enemy James Madison from being elected to the U.S. House of Representatives. He drew Madison’s Virginia district to include as many AntiFederalists as possible. 2 Henry’s plan didn’t work; Madison—a Federalist—
still managed to win a spot in the First Congress. 3 But in the subsequent two
centuries, politicians have taken Henry’s idea and perfected it. 4 Improvements in technology and in data collection have made partisan mapmakers
more effective than ever. 5

* J.D., 2018, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology. The author would like to
thank Kelsey Cox for her insight, her editorial guidance, and her patience.
1. Elizabeth Kolbert, Drawing the Line: How Redistricting Turned America from Blue to Red,
NEW YORKER (June 27, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/06/27/ratfcked-the-influence-of-redistricting [http://perma.cc/98CU-UGCP]. While Patrick Henry offers what many consider to
be the first instance of gerrymandering, the term is derived from critics of Elbridge Gerry, a former governor of Massachusetts. In 1812, Gerry approved a redistricting map which featured a salamander-shaped
district for the purpose of benefitting his own party. See Laughlin McDonald, The Looming 2010 Census:
A Proposed Judicially Manageable Standard and Other Reform Options for Partisan Gerrymandering,
46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 243, 244 (2009).
2. Kolbert, supra note 1.
3. Congress Profiles: 1st Congress (1789–1791), U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: HISTORY,
&
ARCHIVES,
http://history.house.gov/Congressional-Overview/Profiles/1st/
ART
[https://perma.cc/5YGE-5FKX].
4. See generally DAVID DALEY, RATF**CKED: THE TRUE STORY BEHIND THE SECRET PLAN TO
STEAL AMERICA’S DEMOCRACY, at xx (2016) (noting that advances in technology and census data have
led to higher predictability in voting behavior which has allowed for more effective gerrymandering).
5. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 345 (2004) (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that technology
has allowed increased gerrymandering that “has damaged the democratic process to a degree that our
predecessors only began to imagine”); see also Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593, 624 (2002); Pamela S. Karlan, The Fire Next Time: Reapportionment After
the 2000 Census, 50 STAN. L. REV. 731, 736 (1998).
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On both the national and state level, in general, gerrymandering creates
“safe seats” by establishing one-party constituencies, thereby reducing competition in elections. 6 Reformers argue that, as a result, the practice protects
incumbents and incentivizes candidates in primary elections to be more partisan, ultimately producing lawmakers “that take [their] orders from party
leaders, not from voters.” 7 This, in turn, contributes to increased political
polarization among legislators and gridlock. 8
On the state level, the nefarious effects of gerrymandering have
prompted some states to take the role of redrawing electoral districts away
from self-interested lawmakers and entrust the job to independent redistricting commissions. 9 California and Arizona serve as recent examples where
voters passed ballot initiatives to remove state legislators from the remapping process. 10
In recent years, reform advocates in Illinois have attempted to remove
the General Assembly from redrawing state legislative districts altogether. 11
Reformers note the number of uncontested state elections as proof that the
current system protects preferred incumbents. For example, in 2014, more
than half of Illinois’s legislative races—82 of 137—were uncontested in the
general election. 12
6. See Richard Morrill, A Geographer’s Perspective, in POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE
COURTS 213–214 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1990).
7. See generally Daley, supra note 4, at xxxvi–xxxvii (noting that gerrymandering leads to uncompetitive general elections). See also Editorial, Redistricting Rerun: Independent Map Amendment
Draws Lawsuit, CHI. TRIB. (May 12, 2016, 6:11 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/editorials/ct-madigan-illinois-redistricting-lawsuit-independent-maps-edit-0513-jm-20160512-story.html
[http://perma.cc/Z42E-HBHU] (noting that Illinois’s current redistricting system “discourages competition, robs voters of choices and protects mediocre incumbents,” and the system results in “a dysfunctional
General Assembly that takes its orders from party leaders, not from voters”).
8. See generally Paul Krugman, Opinion, How Republics End, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/19/opinion/how-republics-end.html [http://perma.cc/3VW4-C3GM]
(noting “gerrymandered districts” is a cause of hyper-partisan politics).
9. McDonald, supra note 1, at 244–68 (noting that, as of 2009, twelve states employed a special
redistricting commission).
10. See John Wildermuth, Redistricting Victory a Big Win for Governor, SFGATE (Nov. 27, 2008,
4:00
AM),
http://www.sfgate.com/politics/article/Redistricting-victory-a-big-win-for-governor3260386.php [https://perma.cc/6VZM-F8WU]; see also Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Rebuffs Lawmakers over Independent Redistricting Panel, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/30/us/supreme-court-upholds-creation-of-arizona-redistricting-commission.html
[http://perma.cc/39ZW-PPE4]. California and Arizona shifted to redistricting commissions for creating
both state legislative districts and U.S. congressional districts; Illinois reform efforts have been limited to
state redistricting.
11. Editorial, Redistricting Reform: Will an Amendment Finally Make It on the Ballot?, CHI. TRIB.
(Apr. 29, 2016, 4:51 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/editorials/ct-madigan-raunerredistricting-illinois-independent-map-amendment-edit-20160429-story.html [https://perma.cc/KY3XWW53].
12. See Frequently Asked Questions, INDEP. MAP AMENDMENT, http://www.mapamendment.org/Resources-.html#4 (last visited Feb. 1, 2017).
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The Illinois Constitution governs the process for redrawing state legislative districts and currently gives the General Assembly a central role in that
process. 13 Thus, removing Illinois legislators from the redistricting process
requires amending the state constitution. Such an amendment can happen in
one of three ways: (1) a constitutional convention; (2) amendments passed
by the General Assembly and subsequently approved by voters in a general
election; or (3) a citizen ballot initiative approved by voters in a general election. 14 The first two options require affirmative action by the General Assembly, 15 making them an unlikely route to redistricting reform. 16
In Illinois, two recent citizen ballot initiatives seeking to amend the constitution’s redistricting provision have been struck down in court before
reaching voters. 17 Most recently, a group called “Support Independent
Maps”—a self-described “non-partisan statewide coalition”—sought to
place an initiative on the November 2016 ballot. It would have overhauled
the redistricting process by creating an independent redistricting commission
to draw legislative districts and eliminating the General Assembly’s role in
the process. 18 The Illinois Supreme Court ultimately ruled in Hooker v. Illinois State Board of Elections that the initiative violated the Illinois Constitution. 19 Notably, for the purposes of this paper, the court declined to decide
whether any hypothetical redistricting initiative would pass constitutional
muster but instead chose to “leave that question for another day.” 20
This Note addresses the most recent push by interested parties to remove the Illinois General Assembly from the process of redrawing the state’s

13. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
14. Id. art. XIV, §§ 1–3.
15. Id. Section 1 of article XIV does require a ballot initiative calling for a constitutional convention
to be submitted to voters in a general election at least every twenty years. The most recent ballot initiative
calling for a convention failed in 2008, meaning that Illinois voters will not be presented with the choice
again until 2028 unless the General Assembly takes action. Constitution of the State of Illinois: Amendments and Conventions Proposed, ILL. GEN. ASSEMBLY, http://www.ilga.gov/commission/lrb/conampro.htm [https://perma.cc/9AAS-SATW].
16. See generally Editorial, supra note 7 (noting the Illinois General Assembly’s inaction on redistricting reform despite “poll after poll after poll [that] has shown an overwhelming majority of voters
support having an independent commission draw the [legislative] maps”).
17. See Clark v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, No. 14 CH 07356 (Ill. Cir. Ct. June 27, 2014) (declaring
a proposed redistricting initiative invalid); Hooker v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 2016 IL 121077, ¶¶ 46–
50, 63 N.E.3d 824, 839.
18. See generally INDEP. MAP AMENDMENT, http://www.mapamendment.org/About.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2016). See also Editorial, Remap: Illinois Reformers Can Keep Losing to the Democratic
Machine. Or . . ., CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 2, 2016, 2:08 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/editorials/ct-illinois-remap-amendment-madigan-democrats-edit-20160902-story.html
[https://perma.cc/HXA6-AG46].
19. Hooker, 2016 IL 121077, ¶¶ 45–50, 63 N.E.3d at 839.
20. Id. ¶ 45, 63 N.E.3d at 839.
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legislative and representative districts. Part I will examine the history of Illinois’s citizen ballot initiative, including the relevant constitutional provision—article XIV, section 3—as well as case law interpreting the provision.
Part I will also provide the history of Illinois’s redistricting, including the
current redistricting framework provided for in article IV, section 3 of the
Illinois Constitution and relevant case law. Part II will summarize the Hooker
opinion and its procedural history and discuss the parties involved in the
case. Part III will analyze the validity of the Hooker majority’s reasoning as
well as its potential effects on future citizen ballot initiatives; the analysis
will also discuss whether, after Hooker, the citizen ballot initiative remains
a viable means to amend the redistricting process in Illinois. 21
In Hooker, the Illinois Supreme Court took another step to narrow article XIV, section 3, further restricting the public’s ability to amend the state
constitution through citizen ballot initiative. Judicial interpretation of article
XIV, section 3 has been marked by limited analysis, and Hooker continues
that trend. Rather than clarify judicial standards used to determine the constitutional validity of a popular initiative, the Hooker majority arguably muddied the waters, making it more difficult for future redistricting reformers to
draft a citizen initiative that will pass constitutional muster.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Independent Maps’ redistricting initiative marks the third time in Illinois history that a group has attempted to change the state’s redistricting process through a ballot initiative. 22 In order to evaluate the Hooker decision, an
overview of the constitutional provisions governing citizen ballot initiatives
and legislative redistricting, relevant case law interpreting these provisions,
and a brief history of state’s redistricting is necessary.

21. This Note does not analyze Illinois’s process of redrawing its U.S. congressional districts and
does not discuss requirements—stemming from the U.S. Constitution, the Voting Rights Act, or the Illinois Constitution—that determine the legal validity of adopted maps. Nor does this Note analyze the
extent of gerrymandering in Illinois or whether redistricting reform would address the ills associated with
gerrymandering.
22. See Clark, slip op. at 8 (“[A] redistricting initiative has never [before] been proposed or challenged [in court in Illinois].”); see also Hooker, 2016 IL 121077 (addressing legal challenge to redistricting initiative for the second time); Editorial, Citizens First?, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 12, 2010),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-04-12/opinion/ct-edit-remap-20100412_1_house-and-senatemaps-democrats-republican-measure [https://perma.cc/8AVG-K2TH] (noting 2010 citizen initiative entitled “Illinois Fair Map Amendment” that would modify tie-breaking provision in Illinois redistricting
framework; the 2010 initiative ultimately failed to gather enough signatures to be placed on the ballot and
thus never faced legal challenge concerning the constitutional merits of the initiative).
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A. Relevant History of Citizen Ballot Initiatives in Illinois
Illinois’s current constitution, officially adopted in December 1970, 23
was the first to allow for amendment through a form of popular initiative,
known as a citizen ballot initiative. 24 Prior to the 1970 constitution, the only
means to amend Illinois’s constitution was through a constitutional convention or a proposed amendment passed by the General Assembly and then
submitted to voters. 25
1. Citizen Ballot Initiative Framework
Article XIV, section 3, of the Illinois Constitution provides for the citizen ballot initiative and states in relevant part:
Amendments to Article IV of this Constitution may be proposed by
a petition signed by a number of electors equal in number to at least eight
percent of the total votes cast for candidates for Governor in the preceding
gubernatorial election. Amendments shall be limited to structural and procedural subjects contained in Article IV. A petition shall contain the text
of the proposed amendment and the date of the general election at which
the proposed amendment is to be submitted . . . . The procedure for determining the validity and sufficiency of a petition shall be provided by law.
If the petition is valid and sufficient, the proposed amendment shall be
submitted to the electors at that general election and shall become effective if approved by either three-fifths of those voting on the amendment
or a majority of those voting in the election. 26

As the plain language suggests, the constitution limits ballot initiatives
to “structural and procedural subjects contained in Article IV.” 27 Article IV
covers the state legislature, 28 and section 3 of article IV addresses legislative
redistricting. 29 Thus, redistricting is subject to amendment by ballot initiative

23. See Constitution of the State of Illinois, ILL. GEN. ASSEMBLY, http://www.ilga.gov/commission/lrb/conmain.htm [https://perma.cc/6ZM3-UCZN]
24. Coal. for Political Honesty v. State Bd. of Elections, 359 N.E.2d 138, 145 (Ill. 1976) (“There
has not been a prior constitution of Illinois which provided for its amendment by any form of popular
initiative.”).
25. Id.
26. ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3.
27. Id.
28. See generally id. art. IV. In addition to legislative redistricting, article IV covers: the power and
structure of the legislature; legislative composition; elections occurring in even-numbered years; sessions
of the General Assembly; internal organization of the General Assembly; the manner in which committees
conduct business; the procedural requirements for passing bills; veto procedures; effective date of laws;
legislators’ salary and other compensation; legislative immunity; special legislation; impeachment procedures; and adjournment of the General Assembly. Id.
29. Id. art. IV, § 3.
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whereas other subjects—for example, gubernatorial succession, addressed in
article 5—cannot be amended by ballot initiative. 30
Another constitutional provision also governs the validity of a proposed
ballot initiative. Article III, section 3, of the constitution contains the “free
and equal” clause, which states “[a]ll elections shall be free and equal.”31
This seemingly innocuous language effectively prohibits separate questions
from being combined into a single ballot initiative. 32
Illinois courts have commented that the general purpose of article XIV,
section 3 was to create a popular means for legislative reform because
amending the constitution’s legislative article “presented unique problems.” 33 The 1970 constitutional convention delegates feared that legislators
could not represent the will of the people when it came to questions of the
structure of the Illinois General Assembly because legislators’ own self-interest could conflict with the people’s wishes. Delegate Louis J. Perona, who
served as spokesman for the Committee on the Legislature at the convention, 34 explained “[t]he legislature, being composed of human beings, will
be reluctant to change the provisions of the constitution that govern its structure and makeup, the number of its members, and those sort of provisions.” 35
So the delegates created the citizen ballot initiative to allow voters to make
such changes. The delegates made clear they did not intend for the broad
ballot initiative to serve as a vehicle to pass “ordinary legislation,” because
they feared that special interest groups could abuse such a mechanism or that
“hasty and ill-conceived” legislation would bypass the ordinary, deliberative
legislative process. 36
2. Relevant Case Law Addressing Citizen Ballot Initiatives
There have been six reported cases involving challenges to citizen ballot initiatives proposed under article XIV, section 3. 37 These cases—four of

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

See id. art. V, § 6
Id. art. III, § 3.
See Coal. for Political Honesty v. State Bd. of Elections, 415 N.E.2d 368, 378–79 (Ill. 1980).
See id. at 374–75.
Coal. for Political Honesty v. State Bd. of Elections, 359 N.E.2d 138, 139 (Ill. 1976).
Coal. for Political Honesty, 415 N.E.2d at 374 (citing 4 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS: SIXTH
ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 2911 (1972)).
36. Coal. for Political Honesty, 359 N.E.2d at 145 (citing 4 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note
35, at 2712; 7 id. at 2298).
37. See generally id.; Coal. for Political Honesty, 415 N.E.2d 368; Lousin v. State Bd. of Elections,
438 N.E.2d 1241 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982); Chi. Bar Ass’n v. State Bd. of Elections, 561 N.E.2d 50 (Ill. 1990);
Chi. Bar Ass’n v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 641 N.E.2d 525 (Ill. 1994); Clark v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections,
2014 IL App (1st) 141937, 17 N.E.3d 771.
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which were decided by the Illinois Supreme Court—have construed the language of article XIV, section 3 narrowly, thereby restricting what may constitute a valid citizen ballot initiative. Notably, only one proposed ballot
initiative has ever reached the voters.
In Coalition for Political Honesty v. State Board of Elections (“Coalition I”), the Illinois Supreme Court struck down all three proposed ballot
initiatives to article IV. 38 The court interpreted the scope of article XIV, section 3’s language that any ballot initiative “shall be limited to structural and
procedural subjects contained in Article IV.” 39 The court held that a valid
ballot initiative must address both structural and procedural subjects in article IV. 40 The court held that this narrow construction was required because
the delegates to the 1970 constitutional convention intended that the initiative provision not be abused by interest groups to pass ordinary legislation. 41
Four years later, the court decided Coalition for Political Honesty v.
State Board of Elections (“Coalition II”). The court considered a proposed
ballot initiative which sought to (1) reduce the size of the Illinois House of
Representatives, (2) provide for the election of only one representative from
each representative district, and (3) abolish cumulative voting for representatives. 42 The court upheld the ballot initiative, finding that the proposed
amendment related to a structural and procedural change in the state House
of Representatives, a subject found in article IV, section 3. 43 The decision
marks the only time that an Illinois court has found that a ballot initiative
comports with article XIV, section 3. 44 The Coalition II court also addressed
the application of article III’s “free and equal” clause to ballot initiatives.
The challengers argued the ballot initiative violated article III, section 3 because it contained three separate questions; a voter could be forced to answer
“yes” to a question he or she disagreed with in order to approve another
38. Coal. for Political Honesty, 359 N.E.2d at 147. The three initiatives aimed to strengthen conflict-of-interest provisions in the legislative article by (1) limiting and qualifying compensation a lawmaker could receive, (2) forcing disclosure of a conflicts of interest, and (3) prohibiting a lawmaker with
a conflict from voting. Id. at 140.
39. Id. at 140, 146–47.
40. Id. at 146–47.
41. Id. (quoting Delegate Perona’s remarks that “limitation on this initiative eliminates the abuse
which has been made of the initiative in some states . . . [and] prevent[s] it being applied to ordinary
legislation or to changes which do not attack or do not concern the actual structure or makeup of the
legislature itself”). Notably, the Coalition I court also held that a taxpayer suit is the proper vehicle to
challenge the constitutionality of a proposed ballot initiative. Id. at 141–42.
42. Coal. for Political Honesty, 415 N.E.2d at 370–72.
43. Id. at 382.
44. Hooker v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, No. 16 CH 6539, 2016 WL 4581493, at *7 (Ill. Cir. Ct.
July 20, 2016) (“This is the only reported decision to uphold a ballot initiative for submission to the
electorate”), aff’d as amended, 2016 IL 121077, 63 N.E.3d 824.
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question contained in the initiative. 45 The challengers argued such a predicament violated the constitution’s requirement that “[a]ll elections be free and
equal.” 46 The court agreed that unrelated questions would violate the free
and equal clause but held that an initiative can constitutionally combine multiple questions so long as they are “reasonably related to a common objective
in a workable manner.” 47
In Lousin v. State Board of Elections, an appellate court in Illinois’s
First District addressed the constitutionality of a ballot initiative which
would allow voters to introduce bills to the Illinois General Assembly directly by initiative. 48 The First District found the ballot initiative would “vest
[legislative] power . . . in the electors,” which it viewed as a substantive
change to article IV rather than a structural and procedural change. 49 The
court cited the convention delegates’ concerns over special interest groups
abusing the initiative process to pass ordinary legislation and cited Coalition
I’s narrow construction of article XIV, section 3 that barred initiatives affecting the “power of the legislature.” 50
In Chicago Bar Association v. State Board of Elections (“CBA I”), the
Illinois Supreme Court again reigned in the reach of article XIV, section 3.
In CBA I, the court considered an initiative which would have (1) required a
three-fifths vote from each house on bills that would raise state revenues, (2)
required each house to have a revenue committee, and (3) required the committees to hold public hearings before voting on revenue bills. 51 The court
held that, even though the initiative addressed structural and procedural subjects of article IV, 52 it was still unconstitutional because it was not limited to
those subjects. 53 The court found that “[w]rapped up in this structural and
procedural package is a substantive issue not found in article IV—the subject
of increasing State revenue or increasing taxes.” 54 The court noted that holding the initiative was constitutional would allow cleverly drafted ballot initiatives to amend “substantive matters” outside of article IV. 55

45. Coal. for Political Honesty, 415 N.E.2d at 378–79.
46. Id.; see also ILL. CONST. art. III, § 3.
47. Coal. for Political Honesty, 415 N.E.2d at 380, 382.
48. Lousin v. State Bd. of Elections, 438 N.E.2d 1241, 1242–45 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982).
49. Id. at 1246.
50. Id.
51. Chi. Bar Ass’n v. State Bd. of Elections, 561 N.E.2d 50, 52 (Ill. 1990).
52. Id. at 55 (noting that the initiative’s proposed revenue committee satisfied the structural requirement and the proposed public hearings satisfied the procedural requirement).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 56.
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The court addressed a term limits initiative in Chicago Bar Association
v. Illinois State Board of Elections (“CBA II”). 56 The proposed amendment
prohibited a legislator from serving more than eight years. 57 The CBA II majority held the proposed initiative violated article XIV, section 3 because it
did not address either structural or procedural subjects in article IV. 58 The
court found that the initiative affected the “eligibility or qualifications” of an
individual legislator; such qualifications did not address the “structure of the
legislature as an institution” because the General Assembly would remain a
bicameral legislature with the same number of seats. 59 Likewise, the court
found the initiative did not address procedural subjects in article IV because
it would not change the “process by which the General Assembly adopts a
law.” 60
The final reported decision addressing a ballot initiative under article
XIV is Clark v. Illinois State Board of Elections. 61 In Clark, Illinois’s First
District addressed another ballot initiative proposing term limits. 62 The court
noted that the trial court had also addressed a second initiative aimed at
amending the redistricting process but stated the trial court’s decision on the
redistricting initiative was not an issue before the court. 63 Relying on CBA
II, the First District essentially held a term limits amendment was per se unconstitutional because it unavoidably related to the “eligibility or qualification of an individual legislator,” which CBA II had held was neither a
structural nor procedural subject of article IV. 64
Notably, the trial court in Clark also struck down the redistricting initiative. 65 The proposed amendment created qualifications for members of a
redistricting commission, and those qualifications included that a commissioner could not serve in the Illinois legislature or in various other elected or
appointed positions for ten years after serving on the redistricting commission. 66 The trial court found that this essentially created a new qualification
on potential candidates for the General Assembly—that they had not served
56. Chi. Bar Ass’n v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 641 N.E.2d 525, 526 (Ill. 1994).
57. Id. at 526–27.
58. Id. at 528–29.
59. Id. at 529.
60. Id.
61. Clark v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 2014 IL App (1st) 141937, 17 N.E.3d 771.
62. Id. ¶ 1, 17 N.E.3d at 773.
63. Id.
64. Id. ¶ 24, 17 N.E.3d at 778 (quoting Chi. Bar Ass’n, 641 N.E.2d at 529) (“We are bound by our
supreme court’s holding—sparse as its reasoning was—that term limits . . . are neither structural nor procedural . . . .” (citation omitted)).
65. Clark v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, No. 14 CH 07356 (Ill. Cir. Ct. June 27, 2014).
66. Id., slip op. at 2.
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as a commissioner within a decade of running for office—and that such a
qualification, like in CBA II, was neither structural nor procedural. The trial
court also noted that this new qualification would apply to positions outside
of article IV, which would independently violate article XIV, section 3.67
Interestingly, the trial court rejected the challengers’ arguments that the redistricting initiative unconstitutionally took power from the General Assembly to enact substantive laws, i.e., the General Assembly’s power to pass a
new electoral map each decade. 68 The trial court disagreed and held that the
initiative did not limit the General Assembly’s power to enact substantive
law but rather merely limited the legislature’s role in redistricting which was
a subject contained in article IV. 69 The trial court also found the redistricting
initiative did not violate the “free and equal” clause of article III because all
portions of the initiative addressed the same subject, redistricting. 70
B. Relevant History of Redistricting in Illinois
The citizen ballot initiative at issue in Hooker sought to fundamentally
change the redistricting process by essentially removing the Illinois General
Assembly from the process. 71 Evaluating the current redistricting framework, past results of that framework, and the modified framework proposed
in Hooker is helpful in analyzing the Hooker decision.
1. Current Redistricting Framework
As mentioned above, the process for legislative redistricting is established in article IV, section 3. 72 The article provides for redrawing the state’s
legislative districts, from which state senators are elected, and for redrawing

67. See id., slip op. at 9–11.
68. Id., slip op. at 10. The challengers argued that this was a substantive change like those rejected
in Lousin and CBA I.
69. Id. (“[N]othing in the initiative limits the General Assembly’s power to enact substantive laws;
rather, it limits redistricting power that derives from Article IV.”).
70. Id. (“The Redistricting Initiative contains a complicated and detailed plan for redistricting, yet
the plan appears to have ‘a reasonable, workable relationship to the same subject.’” (citing Coal. for
Political Honesty v. State Bd. of Elections, 415 N.E.2d 368, 381 (1980))).
71. See generally 2016 Illinois Independent Redistricting Amendment, INDEP. MAP AMENDMENT,
http://www.mapamendment.org/uploads/mapamendment/documents/illinois_independent_redistricting_amendment.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2017).
72. To note, article IV, section 3—along with the Illinois Constitution as a whole—is silent on the
process for congressional redistricting. Federal law bestows that duty of redrawing Illinois’s U.S. congressional districts on the Illinois General Assembly or—should the General Assembly fail to act—on a
federal court. See ROBERT M. ROGERS, LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH UNIT, ILL. GEN. ASSEMBLY, ILLINOIS
REDISTRICTING HISTORY SINCE 1970, at 3 (2008).
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the state’s representative districts, from which state representatives are
elected. 73
The current language of article IV, section 3 gives the General Assembly and, in particular, party leaders a central role in drawing its own electoral
districts. 74 The General Assembly is given the first chance to redraw the electoral map after each census. 75 If the General Assembly fails to do so by June
30 following the census year, party leaders—the Speaker of the House, the
House Minority Leader, the Senate President, and the Senate Minority
Leader—collectively pick every member of the eight-member Legislative
Redistricting Commission. 76 If the commission fails to adopt a plan, a ninth
commissioner is randomly picked between two candidates, neither of whom

73. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (“One Senator shall be elected from each Legislative District. . . . [O]ne
Representative shall be elected from each Representative District . . . .”).
74. See id. art. IV, § 3(b). The full text of the section states:
(a) Legislative Districts shall be compact, contiguous and substantially equal in population. Representative Districts shall be compact, contiguous, and substantially equal in population.
(b) In the year following each Federal decennial census year, the General Assembly by
law shall redistrict the Legislative Districts and the Representative Districts.
If no redistricting plan becomes effective by June 30 of that year, a Legislative Redistricting Commission shall be constituted not later than July 10. The Commission shall consist of
eight members, no more than four of whom shall be members of the same political party.
The Speaker and Minority Leader of the House of Representatives shall each appoint to
the Commission one Representative and one person who is not a member of the General Assembly. The President and Minority Leader of the Senate shall each appoint to the Commission
one Senator and one person who is not a member of the General Assembly.
The members shall be certified to the Secretary of State by the appointing authorities. A
vacancy on the Commission shall be filled within five days by the authority that made the original appointment. A Chairman and Vice Chairman shall be chosen by a majority of all members
of the Commission.
Not later than August 10, the Commission shall file with the Secretary of State a redistricting plan approved by at least five members.
If the Commission fails to file an approved redistricting plan, the Supreme Court shall
submit the names of two persons, not of the same political party, to the Secretary of State not
later than September 1.
Not later than September 5, the Secretary of State publicly shall draw by random selection
the name of one of the two persons to serve as the ninth member of the Commission.
Not later than October 5, the Commission shall file with the Secretary of State a redistricting plan approved by at least five members.
An approved redistricting plan filed with the Secretary of State shall be presumed valid,
shall have the force and effect of law and shall be published promptly by the Secretary of State.
The Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over actions concerning
redistricting the House and Senate, which shall be initiated in the name of the People of the
State by the Attorney General.
Id. art. IV, § 3.
75. Id. art. IV, § 3(b) (“In the year following each Federal decennial census year, the General Assembly by law shall redistrict the Legislative Districts and the Representative Districts.” (emphasis
added)).
76. Id.
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can be from the same political party, to break the tie between the commissioners. 77 This final step has been criticized by the Illinois Supreme Court as
reducing the rights of voters to “a game of chance” that is not “in the best
interests of anyone except the [political] party which has won [the game].” 78
Thus, under the current framework, legislators—namely party leaders—either directly or indirectly control the redistricting process.
2. Redistricting Since the Passage of the 1970 Constitution
To the layperson, how the current redistricting scheme has worked in
practice may be surprising. Since 1970, five legislative maps have been
drawn, but the General Assembly has directly approved a new legislative
map only once—in 2011. 79 Following the four previous censuses, Illinois
resorted to the backup provision of creating a legislative redistricting commission. 80 In three of those instances, the eight-member commission failed
to approve a map in time, and the tie-breaking provision was triggered. 81
Since 1970, each time a new legislative map was finally created, legal
challenges followed; these challenges generally target the validity of the
maps themselves, such as claims that a particular map violated U.S. Constitution, the Voting Rights Act or the state constitution’s requirement that legislative districts be compact. 82 These issues are outside the scope of this
Note.
However, there are two notable cases in which the Illinois Supreme
Court addressed challenges to the redistricting framework itself. The first
case, People ex rel. Scott v. Grivetti, affirmed the validity of the legislative
77. Id.
78. People ex rel. Burris v. Ryan, 588 N.E.2d 1033, 1035 (Ill. 1992) (“[W]e do not find that a
lottery or a flip of a coin is in the best interests of anyone except the party which has won the toss. The
rights of the voters should not be part of a game of chance. The consequences of such a method affect
everyone.”).
79. General Assembly Redistricting Act of 2011, 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 91/1–91/99 (West
2018).
80. ROGERS, supra note 72, at 3–12; see also People ex rel. Scott v. Grivetti, 277 N.E.2d 881(Ill.
1971); Schrage v. State Bd. of Elections, 430 N.E.2d 483 (Ill. 1981); Burris, 588 N.E.2d 1033; ColeRandazzo v. Ryan, 762 N.E.2d 485 (Ill. 2001); Beaubien v. Ryan, 762 N.E.2d 501 (Ill. 2001).
81. ROGERS, supra note 72, at 5–12; see also Schrage, 430 N.E.2d at 484–85; Burris, 588 N.E.2d
at 1035–36; Beaubien, 762 N.E.2d at 505–06.
82. See, e.g., Scott, 277 N.E.2d 881; Schrage, 430 N.E.2d 483; Rybicki v. State Bd. of Elections,
574 F. Supp. 1082 (N.D. Ill. 1982), supplemented, 574 F. Supp. 1147 (N.D. Ill. 1983), and supplemented,
574 F. Supp. 1161 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Burris, 588 N.E.2d 1033; Ill. Legislative Redistricting Comm’n v.
LaPaille, 786 F. Supp. 704 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Cole-Randazzo, 762 N.E.2d 485; Beaubien, 762 N.E.2d 501;
Winters v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 197 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Ill. 2001), aff’d, 535 U.S. 967 (2002);
Campuzano v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 200 F. Supp. 2d 905 (N.D. Ill. 2002); Radogno v. Ill. State Bd.
of Elections, No. 1:11-CV-04884, 2011 WL 5868225 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 22, 2011), aff’d sub nom. Radogno
v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 568 U.S. 801 (2012).
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redistricting commission but qualified its membership. 83 Grivetti followed
the adoption of the 1971 legislative map, which was drafted by a redistricting
commission. 84 In creating the commission, party leaders had appointed
themselves and their legislative aides to the commission; the Grivetti court
held that their self-appointment violated the state constitution based on “long
standing and well known” public policy and the fact that article IV, section
3 did not explicitly condone such a practice. 85 Moreover, the Grivetti court
also rejected the appointment of the legislative aides to the commission and
cited convention proceedings that showed the non-legislator commissioners
were intended to be members of the public, not aides who were not truly
independent from the General Assembly. 86
The second relevant case addressed the validity of the tie-breaking provision of section 3(b). In Winters v. Illinois State Board. of Elections, plaintiffs sued in federal court, alleging that the random selection of the ninth
redistricting commissioner in the event of deadlock violated the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 87 The federal district court rejected both arguments, finding that the
tie-breaking provision did not create any sort of equal protection classification nor did implicate a fundamental right under substantive due process. 88
In summation, courts have generally held that Illinois’s current redistricting framework is valid, regardless of whether the maps it produces run
afoul of federal law or the Illinois constitution. Moreover, although the Illinois General Assembly plays a central role in the process, in practice, the
maps have largely not been the result of direct action by the General Assembly. Four of the five maps have been produced by a legislative redistricting
commission, and three of those commissions triggered the tie-breaking provision, which, again, the Illinois Supreme Court has criticized as allowing a
“game of chance” to determine the rights of voters. 89
II. HOOKER V. ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS
Hooker v. Illinois State Board of Elections marks the most recent attempt at redistricting reform and is the first occasion that the Illinois Supreme

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Scott, 277 N.E.2d at 883–86.
Id. at 883.
Id. at 886.
Id. at 885.
Winters, 197 F. Supp. 2d at 1112.
Id. at 1114–18.
People ex rel. Burris v. Ryan, 588 N.E.2d 1033, 1035 (Ill. 1992).
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Court has addressed the validity of a citizen ballot initiative that would
amend the constitution’s legislative redistricting provision. 90
A. Relevant Background
1. Primary Parties
The citizen ballot initiative at issue in Hooker was proposed by Support
Independent Maps (“Independent Maps”), a ballot initiative committee
formed in April 2015. 91 The group’s purported purpose was to pass a citizen
ballot initiative in November 2016 that would amend legislative redistricting
to increase transparency and essentially remove the Illinois General Assembly from the mapmaking process. 92 The self-described “nonpartisan
statewide coalition” touted civic organizations, community organizations,
and current and former elected officials from both political parties among its
“supporters.” 93 The group raised more than $4 million 94 and collected about

90. See Hooker v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, No. 16 CH 6539, 2016 WL 4581493, at *7 (Ill. Cir.
Ct. July 20, 2016) (“While one trial court has dealt with a differing version of a Redistricting Initiative,
no appellate or Illinois Supreme Court case has ruled on the issue presented in this case, and thus, this
case presents an issue of first impression.”), aff’d as amended, 2016 IL 121077, 63 N.E.3d 824.
91. Support Independent Maps is still registered as an active ballot initiative committee with the
Illinois State Board of Elections as of this writing. See SUPPORT INDEP. MAPS, FORM D-1, STATEMENT
ORGANIZATION
(2015), http://www.elections.il.gov/CampaignDiscloOF
sure/CDPdfViewer.aspx?FiledDocID=fwpimoQ6hTS%2bCchYH5kqwQ%3d%3d&DocType=%2fwY5Q6gLz9EZSXGO4xdasQ%3d%3d [https://perma.cc/W3Q7-F34H]; see also Committee
Details: Support Independent Maps, ILL. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, http://www.elections.il.gov/CampaignDisclosure/CommitteeDetail.aspx?id=lW3HETzSGD8S%2fUVEcqt%2fUw%3d%3d&pageindex=gVMkr%2fdFU6w%3d [https://perma.cc/C9BJ-3NT5].
92. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 12 (“We can, and must, change [the redistricting]
system by removing partisan consideration from map-making and making the process transparent.”); see
also 2016 Illinois Independent Redistricting Amendment, supra note 71.
93. See
Supporters,
INDEP.
MAP
AMENDMENT,
http://www.mapamendment.org/SUPPORTERS.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2017). The committee’s board of directors included
Chairman Dennis FitzSimons, Peter Bensinger, and Mary Kubasak. See Board of Directors, INDEP. MAP
AMENDMENT, http://www.mapamendment.org/About/Board-of-Directors.html (last visited Feb. 1,
2017).
94. See SUPPORT INDEP. MAPS, FORM D-2, REPORT OF CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND
EXPENDITURES: QUARTERLY REPORT (2017), http://www.elections.il.gov/CampaignDisclosure/CommitteeDetail.aspx?id=lW3HETzSGD8S%2fUVEcqt%2fUw%3d%3d&pageindex=gVMkr%2fdFU6w%3d [https://perma.cc/L4PV-J4U7]; SUPPORT INDEP. MAPS, FORM D-2, REPORT
OF CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND EXPENDITURES: QUARTERLY REPORT (2016), http://www.elections.il.gov/CampaignDisclosure/CommitteeDetail.aspx?id=lW3HETzSGD8S%2fUVEcqt%2fUw%3d%3d&pageindex=gVMkr%2fdFU6w%3d [https://perma.cc/YY276XGN]; Editorial, supra note 7.
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563,000 voter signatures, 95 nearly twice the amount of signatures needed to
place a citizen initiative on the 2016 ballot. 96
The challenge to the initiative was led by The People’s Map (“People’s
Map”), another ballot initiative committee formed in August 2015. 97 The
group was chaired by John Hooker, the current chairman of the Chicago
Housing Authority Board of Commissioners, 98 and its stated purpose was
“[t]o support or oppose referenda regarding redistricting.” 99 To that end, the
group raised a total of $25,000 in contributions. 100 Although Hooker v. Illinois State Board of Elections involved multiple parties, 101 the dispute was
essentially between People’s Map and Independent Maps.
2. Independent Maps Proposed Amendment
The amendment proposed by Independent Maps’ initiative would entirely replace the current section 3 of article IV with a new redistricting
framework. 102 This new section 3 provided:
95. Rick Pearson, Illinois Supreme Court Rejects New Hearing for Redistricting Amendment, CHI.
TRIB. (Sept. 13, 2016, 12:54 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-illinois-supreme-court-remap-amendment-met-09-20160913-story.html [http://perma.cc/ZB67-G7US].
96. See ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3 (requiring initiative to have signatures equal to eight percent of
number of votes cast in last gubernatorial election); see also Election Results: General Election
STATE
B D.
OF
ELECTIONS,
https://www.elections.il.gov/ElectionRe11/4/2014,
ILL.
sults.aspx?ID=XEXru5CD3O8%3d [https://perma.cc/U7NF-8M63].
97. See THE PEOPLE’S MAP, FORM D-1, STATEMENT OF ORGANIZATION (2015), https://www.elections.il.gov/CampaignDisclosure/CDPdfViewer.aspx?FiledDocID=GAp16Iig0nKx%2bWCaAhivOA%3d%3d&DocType=%2fwY5
Q6gLz9EZSXGO4xdasQ%3d%3d [https://perma.cc/Y52W-5D9N].
98. See Board of Commissioners, CHI. HOUS. AUTH., http://www.thecha.org/about/board-of-commissioners/ [https://perma.cc/3D3K-GBKE]; see also Editorial, Who’s Financing the Fight Against Fair
Legislative Maps?, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 10, 2016, 11:58 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/editorials/ct-illinois-remap-supreme-court-madigan-edit-20160810-story.html
[http://perma.cc/E4QJ-6PG5].
99. See Committee Detail: The People’s Map, ILL. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, https://www.elections.il.gov/CampaignDisclosure/CommitteeDetail.aspx?id=mXO3CqAigT8WGLjSoQtEjQ%3d%3d
[https://perma.cc/6P4J-SXNZ].
100. The contributions—which came from Chicago-based personal injury law firms and union
groups—were disclosed in December 2016 when the committee was dissolved. See THE PEOPLE’S MAP,
FORM D-2, REPORT OF CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND EXPENDITURES: FINAL REPORT (2016),
https://www.elections.il.gov/CampaignDisclosure/CommitteeDetail.aspx?id=mXO3CqAigT8WGLjSoQtEjQ%3d%3d [https://perma.cc/R2KU-RT32].
101. The named defendants included the Illinois Board of Elections, State Comptroller Leslie
Munger, Secretary of State Jesse White, State Treasurer Michael Frerichs, Cook County Clerk David Orr,
and the Board of Election Commissioners for the City of Chicago. In addition to John Hooker, the named
plaintiffs included Leon Finney, Elzie Higgenbottom, Raymond Chin, Fernando Grillo, Jorge Perez,
Craig Chico, and Frank Clark. See Hooker v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 2016 IL 121077, ¶¶ 9–10, 63
N.E.3d 824, 830.
Notably, with the exception of Jorge Perez, all the Hooker plaintiffs were also named plaintiffs in Clark
v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 2014 IL App (1st) 141937, 17 N.E.3d 771, which had invalidated the
citizen redistricting initiative in 2014.
102. Hooker, 2016 IL 121077, ¶ 6, 63 N.E.3d at 827–30.
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(a) The Independent Redistricting Commission comprising 11 Commissioners shall adopt and file with the Secretary of State a redistricting plan
for Legislative Districts and Representative Districts by June 30 of the
year following each Federal decennial census. Legislative Districts shall
be contiguous and substantially equal in population. Representative Districts shall be contiguous and substantially equal in population. The redistricting plan shall comply with Federal law. Subject to the foregoing, the
Commission shall apply the following criteria: (1) the redistricting plan
shall not dilute or diminish the ability of a racial or language minority
community to elect the candidates of its choice, including when voting in
concert with other persons; (2) the redistricting plan shall respect the geographic integrity of units of local government; and (3) the redistricting
plan shall respect the geographic integrity of communities sharing common social and economic interests, which do not include relationships
with political parties or candidates for office. The redistricting plan shall
not either intentionally or unduly discriminate against or intentionally or
unduly favor any political party, political group or particular person. In
designing the redistricting plan, the Commission shall consider party registration and voting history data only to assess compliance with the requirements in this subsection (a).
(b) For the purpose of conducting the Commissioner selection process, an
Applicant Review Panel comprising three Reviewers shall be chosen in
the following manner. Beginning not later than January 1 and ending not
later than March 1 of the year in which the Federal decennial census occurs, the Auditor General shall request and accept applications to serve as
a Reviewer. The Auditor General shall review all applications and select
a pool of 30 potential Reviewers. The Auditor General should select applicants for the pool of potential Reviewers who would operate in an ethical and non-partisan manner by considering whether each applicant is a
resident and registered voter of the State and has been for the four years
preceding his or her application, has demonstrated understanding of and
adherence to standards of ethical conduct and has been unaffiliated with
any political party for the three years preceding appointment. By March
31 of the year in which the Federal decennial census occurs, the Auditor
General shall publicly select by random draw the Panel of three Reviewers
from the pool of potential Reviewers.
(c) Beginning not later than January 1 and ending not later than March 1
of the year in which the Federal decennial census occurs, the Auditor General shall request and accept applications to serve as a Commissioner on
the Independent Redistricting Commission. By May 31, the Panel shall
select a pool of 100 potential Commissioners. The Panel should select applicants for the pool of potential Commissioners who would be diverse
and unaffected by conflicts of interest by considering whether each applicant is a resident and registered voter of the State and has been for the four
years preceding his or her application, as well as each applicant’s prior
political experience, relevant analytical skills, ability to contribute to a fair
redistricting process and ability to represent the demographic and geographic diversity of the State. The Panel shall act by affirmative vote of
two Reviewers. All records of the Panel, including applications to serve
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on the Panel, shall be open for public inspection, except private information about applicants for which there is no compelling public interest
in disclosure.
(d) Within 45 days after the Panel has selected the pool of 100 potential
Commissioners, but not later than June 23 of the year in which the Federal
decennial census occurs, the Speaker and Minority Leader of the House
of Representatives and the President and Minority Leader of the Senate
each may remove up to five of those potential Commissioners. Thereafter,
but not later than June 30, the Panel shall publicly select seven Commissioners by random draw from the remaining pool of potential Commissioners; of those seven Commissioners, including any replacements, (1)
the seven Commissioners shall reside among the Judicial Districts in the
same proportion as the number of Judges elected therefrom under Section
3 of Article VI of this Constitution, (2) two Commissioners shall be affiliated with the political party whose candidate for Governor received the
most votes cast in the last general election for Governor, two Commissioners shall be affiliated with the political party whose candidate for Governor received the second-most votes cast in such election and the
remaining three Commissioners shall not be affiliated with either such political party and (3) no more than two Commissioners may be affiliated
with the same political party. The Speaker and Minority Leader of the
House of Representatives and the President and Minority Leader of the
Senate each shall appoint one Commissioner from among the remaining
applicants in the pool of potential Commissioners on the basis of the appointee’s contribution to the demographic and geographic diversity of the
Commission. A vacancy on the Panel or Commission shall be filled within
five days by a potential Reviewer or potential Commissioner from among
the applicants remaining in the pool of potential Reviewers or potential
Commissioners, respectively, in the manner in which the office was previously filled.
(e) The Commission shall act in public meetings by affirmative vote of six
Commissioners, except that approval of any redistricting plan shall require
the affirmative vote of at least (1) seven Commissioners total, (2) two
Commissioners from each political party whose candidate for Governor
received the most and second[-]most votes cast in the last general election
for Governor and (3) two Commissioners not affiliated with either such
political party. The Commission shall elect its chairperson and vice chairperson, who shall not be affiliated with the same political party. Six Commissioners shall constitute a quorum. All meetings of the Commission
attended by a quorum, except for meetings qualified under attorney-client
privilege, shall be open to the public and publicly noticed at least two days
prior to the meeting. All records of the Commission, including communications between Commissioners regarding the Commission’s work, shall
be open for public inspection, except for records qualified under attorneyclient privilege. The Commission shall adopt rules governing its procedure, public hearings and the implementation of matters under this Section. The Commission shall hold public hearings throughout the state both
before and after releasing the initial proposed redistricting plan. The Commission may not adopt a final redistricting plan unless the plan to be
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adopted without further amendment, and a report explaining its compliance with this Constitution, have been publicly noticed at least seven days
before the final vote on such plan.
(f) If the Commission fails to adopt and file with the Secretary of State a
redistricting plan by June 30 of the year following a Federal decennial
census, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the most senior Judge
of the Supreme Court who is not affiliated with the same political party as
the Chief Justice shall appoint jointly by July 31 a Special Commissioner
for Redistricting. The Special Commissioner shall adopt and file with the
Secretary of State by August 31 a redistricting plan satisfying the requirements set forth in subsection (a) of this Section and a report explaining its
compliance with this Constitution. The Special Commissioner shall hold
at least one public hearing in the State before releasing his or her initial
proposed redistricting plan and at least one public hearing in a different
location in the State after releasing his or her initial proposed redistricting
plan and before filing the final redistricting plan with the Secretary of
State. All records of the Special Commissioner shall be open for public
inspection, except for records qualified under attorney-client privilege.
(g) An adopted redistricting plan filed with the Secretary of State shall be
presumed valid and shall be published promptly by the Secretary of State.
(h) The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in cases relating to
matters under this Section. 103

On its face, the amendment would drastically alter Illinois’s legislative
redistricting. The role of the Illinois General Assembly would be all but eliminated. The Illinois General Assembly would no longer have the first chance
to adopt an electoral map; instead, the job would fall to an eleven-member
“Independent Redistricting Commission.” 104 Further, lawmakers would not
have a say in selecting the members of the commission, save for a limited
role for party leaders. 105
For purposes of analyzing the Hooker decision, the amended article IV,
section 3 would make six significant changes to the current framework. First,
the bulk of the work of establishing the Independent Redistricting Commission would fall to the Illinois Auditor General, who currently has no role in
redistricting. 106 Second, the proposed language would modify the Illinois Supreme Court’s jurisdiction under article IV, section 3 to eliminate the court’s

103. Id. (alteration in original); 2016 Illinois Independent Redistricting Amendment, supra note 71.
104. Hooker, 2016 IL 121077, ¶ 6, 63 N.E.3d at 827–30.
105. See id. Subsection (d) of the new framework allows the House Speaker, the House Minority
Leader, the Senate President, and the Senate Minority Leader to each strike five members of the pool of
100 potential commissioners; the leaders are also permitted to each appoint one commissioner from the
pre-selected pool “on the basis of the appointee’s contribution to the demographic and geographic diversity of the Commission.” Id.
106. Id.
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exclusive jurisdiction. 107 Third, instead of a randomized tie-breaking provision, the proposed framework would require that two justices of the Illinois
Supreme Court jointly appoint a “Special Commissioner” who would then
unilaterally submit the final map. 108 Fourth, under the amended framework,
the justices appointing the special commissioner could not be members of
the same political party. 109 Fifth, the amendment would remove from section
3 language granting the Illinois Attorney General the exclusive ability to initiate actions concerning legislative redistricting. 110 Finally, in describing the
requirements for each electoral district, the proposed framework removes the
word “compact” while adding language ostensibly aimed at curbing gerrymandering and ensuring compliance with federal voting law. 111
Notably, although ultimately not germane to the Hooker opinion, the
amendment also adds transparency measures; it requires that all applications
to serve on the Independent Redistricting Commission be made publicly
available and requires that the commission—and any special commissioner—hold public meetings and make all its records public as well. 112
B. Procedural History
On May 6, 2016, Independent Maps filed a petition with the Illinois
Board of Elections to bring their proposed amendment before voters in the

107. Compare id. (“The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in cases relating to matters
under this Section.” (emphasis added)), with ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 3(b) (“The Supreme Court shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction over actions concerning redistricting the House and Senate . . . .” (emphasis added)).
108. See Hooker, 2016 IL 121077, ¶ 6, 63 N.E.3d at 827–30.
109. Id.
110. See id.
111. Compare id. (“[T]he Commission shall apply the following criteria: (1) the redistricting plan
shall not dilute or diminish the ability of a racial or language minority community to elect the candidates
of its choice, including when voting in concert with other persons; (2) the redistricting plan shall respect
the geographic integrity of units of local government; and (3) the redistricting plan shall respect the geographic integrity of communities sharing common social and economic interests, which do not include
relationships with political parties or candidates for office. The redistricting plan shall not either intentionally or unduly discriminate against or intentionally or unduly favor any political party, political group
or particular person. In designing the redistricting plan, the Commission shall consider party registration
and voting history data only to assess compliance with the requirements in this subsection (a).”), with
ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 3(a) (“Legislative Districts shall be compact, contiguous and substantially equal in
population. Representative Districts shall be compact, contiguous, and substantially equal in population.”
(emphasis added)).
112. See Hooker, 2016 IL 121077, ¶ 6, 63 N.E.3d at 827–30; 2016 Illinois Independent Redistricting
Amendment, supra note 71 (removing altogether the language from ILL. CONST. IV, § 3(b) which states
“actions . . . shall be initiated in the name of the People of the State by the Attorney General”).
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2016 general election. 113 Five days later, on May 11, 2016, People’s Map 114
filed a “taxpayer’s suit”—an action to restrain and enjoin the disbursement
of public funds in relation to the proposed amendment—in the Circuit Court
of Cook County’s Chancery Division. 115 The suit was filed before Independent Maps’ petition was officially declared valid and certified for placement
on the ballot. 116
People’s Map named as defendants the Illinois State Board of Elections
and various other state officials who would necessarily expend public funds
related to the citizen initiative. 117 Independent Maps filed a petition to intervene to defend their citizen initiative; the trial court granted Independent
Maps’ petition. 118
In relevant part, People’s Map complaint alleged that the proposed initiative was unconstitutional in seven ways. 119 Count I alleged that imposing
duties on the state’s Auditor General violated article XIV, section 3. 120 Count
II alleged that the initiative unconstitutionally changed the subject matter jurisdiction of both the Illinois Supreme Court and the circuit courts. 121 Count
III alleged that the initiative unconstitutionally imposed new duties on two
members of the Illinois Supreme Court, i.e., requiring the justices to select a
special commissioner in event of deadlock. 122 Count IV alleged that the initiative required political party affiliation by Illinois Supreme Court justices,
which violated article XIV, section 3. 123 Count V alleged that the initiative

113. Hooker v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, No. 16 CH 6539, 2016 WL 4581493, at *1 (Ill. Cir. Ct.
July 20, 2016), aff’d as amended, 2016 IL 121077, 63 N.E.3d 824.
114. Again, the named plaintiffs in the suit were: John Hooker, Chairman of The People’s Map;
Frank Clark; Leon Finney; Elzie Higgenbottom; Raymond Chin; Fernando Grilllo; Jorge Perez; and Craig
Chico. Hooker is the only individual associated with The People’s Map; the other plaintiffs are members
of various other civic and political organizations. See id. at *2. The plaintiffs are collectively referred to
as “People’s Map.”
115. Id.; see also Hooker, 2016 IL 121077, ¶ 8, 63 N.E.3d at 830.
116. See Hooker, 2016 IL 121077, ¶ 8 n.2, 63 N.E.3d at 830 n.2 (noting that taxpayer suit is proper
means to challenge constitutionality of a proposed ballot initiative and that the issue was ripe despite that
Independent Maps’ petition had not yet been certified for November 2016 ballot).
117. Again, the named defendants were: Illinois Board of Elections and its members; State Comptroller Leslie Munger; Secretary of State Jesse White; State Treasurer Michael Frerichs; Cook County
Clerk David Orr; and the Board of Election Commissioners for the City of Chicago and its members.
Hooker, 2016 WL 4581493, at *1.
118. Id.
119. Id. at *3. The complaint alleged a total of eleven counts but Counts VIII through XI merely
sought permanent injunctions against expenditure of public funds in connection with the proposed initiative.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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violated article XIV, section 3 because it did not change the structure or procedure of the General Assembly and was also not limited to structural and
procedural changes to the General Assembly. 124 Count VI alleged that removing the Attorney General’s power to initiate redistricting actions violated
article XIV, section 3. 125 Additionally, Count VII alleged that the proposed
citizen initiative violated the “free and equal” clause of article III, section 3
because it combined separate questions. 126
After People’s Map and Independent Maps filed cross motions for judgment on the pleadings, Judge Diane Joan Larsen issued an opinion on July
20, 2016 finding the proposed citizen initiative unconstitutional and granting
People’s Map’s motion as to Counts I through VII. 127 In its analysis, the court
made clear that considering the “wisdom or desirability of the Redistricting
Initiative before it” was not the court’s role; rather, its sole responsibility was
determining whether the proposed amendment comported with Illinois’s
constitution. 128
In regard to Count I, the court found the initiative’s provision relating
to the Auditor General did indeed violate article XIV, section 3 for two reasons. 129 First, the court noted that the Auditor General was not a subject
found in article IV, so the amendment was not limited to subjects in article
IV. Second, the court viewed assigning duties to the Auditor General a substantive change to the Auditor General’s duties, which are provided in article
VIII. 130 Notably, the court apparently disregarded Independent Maps’ reliance on the conclusion drawn by the Clark trial court in dictum that eliminating the roles of certain officials—like the Governor or Attorney
General—provided in the current redistricting framework does not take a
citizen initiative “outside of article IV.” 131
In regard to Count II, the trial court found that the initiative impermissibly modified the subject matter jurisdiction of both the Illinois Supreme
Court and the state’s circuit courts. 132 The court first found that although
article IV, section 3 discusses the “original and exclusive” jurisdiction of the
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at *18; see also id. at *1 n.2 (refusing to enter judgment on counts seeking injunction because the issue had not been briefed).
128. Id. at *6.
129. Id. at *9.
130. Id.
131. Id.; see also Clark v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, No. 14 CH 07356, slip op. at 10 (Ill. Cir. Ct.
June 27, 2014) (“[E]liminating the Governor’s right to veto a plan or the Attorney General’s role in redistricting litigation does not take this initiative outside of Article IV.”).
132. Hooker, 2016 WL 4581493, at *9.
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Illinois Supreme Court, the matter was not “structural” or “procedural” as
defined in CBA II and thus could not be changed by a citizen ballot initiative. 133 Second, the court found that the change would effectively expand the
circuit court’s subject matter jurisdiction, a “substantive matter beyond a
structural and procedural subject of article IV, section 3.” 134
Count III of People’s Map’s complaint, again, alleged that the proposed
initiative impermissibly assigned new duties to two individual Illinois Supreme Court justices, i.e., jointly selecting a special commissioner in the
event of deadlock. Although the court acknowledged that the Illinois Supreme Court—as a whole—is a subject of article IV, it is “not a structural
and procedural subject of article IV” and thus outside the reach of a citizen
initiative. 135 Moreover, the court found that the proposed initiative would
impose duties on two individual justices—not the supreme court as a
whole—and that the duties of individual justices is not a subject of article IV
but rather is a subject of article VI. 136 The court found that either reason
warranted granting judgment for People’s Map on Count III.
In regard to Count IV, the court granted judgment in favor of People’s
Map because it concluded that the proposed amendment would impermissibly require Illinois Supreme Court justices to be affiliated with a political
party. 137 The court found that the Illinois constitution does not currently require an Illinois Supreme Court justice to have a political affiliation, and
thus, the initiative would effectively create a new eligibility requirement for
an Illinois Supreme Court justice and would thereby impermissibly change
article VI of the constitution. 138
Count V attacked the proposed initiative by arguing it would not change
the structure and procedure of the General Assembly and was not limited to
the structure and procedure of the General Assembly. 139 After discussing the
convention’s legislative history and case law considering citizen ballot initiatives, the court found that the proposed initiative did include structural and
procedural subjects contained in article IV. 140 However, the court found the

133. Id. at *10. The court relied on the narrow definition of structural—“the structure of the legislature as an institution”—and procedural—“the General Assembly’s procedures”—given in CBA II. Id.
(quoting Chi. Bar Ass’n v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 641 N.E.2d 525, 529 (Ill. 1994)).
134. Id.
135. Id. at *11.
136. Id.
137. Id. at *13.
138. Id.
139. Id. at *3.
140. Id. at *15.
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proposed initiative was not limited to structural and procedural subjects,
given its conclusions on Counts I through IV. 141
In regard to Count VI, the court found that the proposed amendment’s
removal of the Attorney General’s explicit responsibility to initiate actions
concerning redistricting also violated article XIV, section 3 because that responsibility could not be deemed “structural and procedural subjects of article IV.” 142 Thus, the proposed citizen was unconstitutional.
Finally, the court also granted judgment in favor of People’s Map on
Count VII; the court found that—independent of issues relating to article
XIV, section 3—the proposed initiative violated the “free and equal” clause
of article III, section 3. 143 The court found that the proposed initiative presented questions relating to: (1) state officials other than members of the
General Assembly; (2) “the circuit court’s [subject matter] jurisdiction”; and
(3) “the method of challenging a redistricting plan.” 144 The court found that
these matters were significantly unrelated to redistricting and thus the initiative presented separate, unrelated questions, which ran afoul of article III’s
“free and equal” clause.
Following the trial court’s opinion, Independent Maps appealed and
moved to transfer the case directly to the Illinois Supreme Court. 145 The Illinois Supreme Court granted the motion. 146
C. Hooker v. Illinois State Board of Elections Opinion
The court issued its opinion without hearing oral argument. 147 The court
affirmed the decision of the trial court—albeit through different reasoning—
and held that the citizen ballot initiative proposed by Independent Maps violated the Illinois Constitution. 148 Observers noted the decision divided the
141. Id.
142. Id. at *16.
143. Id. at *17–18.
144. Id. at *18.
145. Hooker v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 2016 IL 121077, ¶ 18, 63 N.E.3d 824, 832. Independent
Maps’ motion was filed pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 302(b). See ILL. SUP. CT. R. 302(b)
(“After the filing of the notice of appeal to the Appellate Court in a case in which the public interest
requires prompt adjudication by the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court or a justice thereof may order
that the appeal be taken directly to it. Upon the entry of such an order any documents already filed in the
Appellate Court shall be transmitted by the clerk of that court to the clerk of the Supreme Court. From
that point the case shall proceed in all respects as though the appeal had been taken directly to the Supreme
Court.”).
146. Hooker, 2016 IL 121077, ¶ 18, 63 N.E.3d at 832.
147. Id. Notably, more than two dozen groups filed amicus curiae briefs in support of Independent
Maps. See id. ¶ 18 n.4, 63 N.E.3d at 832 n.4 (listing groups).
148. Id. ¶ 50, 63 N.E.3d at 839. Also, the court’s opinion was originally filed in August 25, 2016
and was modified on September 12, 2016 after the Court denied Independent Maps’ motion to reconsider
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Illinois Supreme Court along political party lines with the four Democratic
justices voting to affirm the trial court’s decision and the three Republican
justices voting to reverse. 149
1. Majority Opinion
The majority’s opinion, issued by Justice Thomas L. Kilbride, essentially struck down the ballot initiative for one reason: the proposed amendment contained at least one “subject”—the duties of the Auditor General—
that was not found in article IV. 150 This alone was enough to violate article
XIV, section 3. Unlike the circuit court’s decision, the Hooker majority did
not address the merits of all challenges to the ballot initiative made by People’s Map. 151
The opinion characterized People’s Map’s challenge to the proposed
ballot initiative as raising “two basic lines of constitutional argument”: (1)
that the initiative violated article XIV, section 3 of the Illinois Constitution
because it was not “limited to structural and procedural subjects contained
in Article IV”; and (2) that the initiative violated article III, section 3 because
it “impermissibly combine[d] separate and unrelated questions into a single
ballot [initiative].” 152
In regard to the first line of argument, the court reaffirmed its view that
the framers of the 1970 Illinois Constitution intended the citizen ballot initiative to be “a very limited form of constitutional initiative.” 153 The court also
noted that the limitations that article XIV, section 3 places on citizen ballot
initiatives “is apparently unique to Illinois” and, as such, case law from other
states could not be looked to for guidance. 154
The court then addressed Count I of People’s Map’s complaint, concerning the amendment’s proposed role of the Auditor General. The court
found this issue dispositive. 155 It identified and addressed three arguments
the decision. See Hooker v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 2016 IL 121077, 2016 WL 4485084, modified on
denial of reh’g, 2016 IL 12077, 63 N.E.3d 824. The synopsis contained in this Note reflects the modified
opinion.
149. See generally Hooker, 2016 IL 121077, 63 N.E.3d 824. See also Rick Pearson, Sharply Divided
Illinois Supreme Court Keeps Redistricting Question off Fall Ballot, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 26, 2016, 5:19
AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-illinois-supreme-court-independent-mapruling-met-0826-20160825-story.html [https://perma.cc/EZN9-XLW2].
150. Hooker, 2016 IL 121077, ¶ 42, 63 N.E.3d at 838. The court found this issue dispositive and
thus did not rule on any other issue raised by People’s Map. See id. ¶ 25, 63 N.E.3d at 834.
151. See generally id. ¶¶ 19–50, 63 N.E.3d at 832–39.
152. Id. ¶ 22, 63 N.E.3d at 833.
153. Id. ¶ 23 (citing Chi. Bar Ass’n v. State Bd. of Elections, 561 N.E.2d 50, 54 (Ill. 1990)).
154. Id. ¶ 22, 63 N.E.3d at 833 (quoting Coal. for Political Honesty v. State Bd. of Elections, 415
N.E.2d 368, 375 (1980)).
155. Id. ¶ 25, 63 N.E.3d at 834.
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made by Independent Maps: (1) that assigning the Auditor General a role in
redistricting—which is a subject of article IV—did not change the Auditor
General’s other duties described in article VIII, section 3; (2) that the new
duties were not the sort of substantive change that the framers of the 1970
constitution sought to prevent by limiting citizen ballot initiatives; and (3)
that meaningful redistricting reform would require assigning duties to nonlegislative actors. 156
The court rejected the first argument, finding that the new role would
have a “material effect” on article VIII. 157 Article VIII, section 3 provides
the duties of the Auditor General, which include conducting audits of public
funds, creating reports and conducting investigations directed by the General
Assembly, and reporting its findings to the General Assembly and Governor. 158 The proposed amendment would give the Auditor General the additional duties of accepting and screening applicants for the review panel as
well as accepting applications for redistricting commissioner. 159 The court
found these new duties to be “time-consuming and resource-intensive” and
that their performance would necessarily take time away from the Auditor
General’s duties outlined in article VIII, section 3. As such, the court found
the opportunity cost of performing the new duties had a “material effect on
another section of our constitution[, i.e., article VIII, section 3], in violation
of article XIV, section 3.” 160 Moreover, the court rejected the argument that
the new duties did not change article VIII, section 3 because the new duties
would not be “unduly burdensome.” 161 The court found that the Auditor General’s “hypothetical ability” to perform all its duties adequately—including
the proposed duties—did not affect the constitutionality of the proposal. 162
Similarly, the court found the second argument—that the newly proposed duties were not the sort of change that the constitutional delegates
sought to bar from citizen initiatives—unpersuasive. 163 Distinguishing the
proposed initiative from the one at issue in CBA I, Independent Maps argued
that the proposed initiative’s role for the Auditor General was “not being
used as a subterfuge to undermine the duties the Constitution assigns to the
Auditor General in Article VIII,” but rather was “aimed solely at reforming

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. ¶ 26, 63 N.E.3d at 834.
Id. ¶ 29, 63 N.E.3d at 835.
ILL. CONST. art. VIII, § 3(b).
See 2016 Illinois Independent Redistricting Amendment, supra note 71.
Hooker, 2016 IL 121077, ¶ 29, 63 N.E.3d at 835.
Id. ¶ 30, 63 N.E.3d at 835.
Id.
Id. ¶ 31, 63 N.E.3d at 836.
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the redistricting process.” 164 Put another way, Independent Maps argued that
the initiative was not intended to affect substantive change to the Auditor
General’s duties but rather was meant to reform the redistricting process, and
thus, the initiative was not the sort of nefarious citizen initiative the delegates
sought to prevent. However, the court rejected this argument, noting simply
that the “propriety” of the underlying intent of an initiative is not a “factor
in the test” to determine whether a proposed initiative comports with article
XIV, section 3. 165 While acknowledging that the convention delegates
sought to prevent ballot initiatives from being used as a “backdoor” to affect
substantive change to the constitution, the court stressed that the only limitations actually placed on citizen ballot initiatives was that they be limited to
structural and procedural subjects contained in article IV. 166
The court then went on to clarify that its sole role was to determine
whether the proposed initiative complied with the “strict limitations set out
in article XIV, section 3.” 167 It found that the language of article XIV, section
3 was unambiguous 168 and then went on to discuss its past holdings interpreting the section’s language as well comments made by convention delegates. 169 In particular, the court relied on CBA I, which found that an
initiative’s requirement that any bill increasing state revenue receive a threefifth vote violated article XIV, section 3 because revenue was a substantive
subject not found in article IV. 170
In ultimately striking down the proposed initiative, the court found that
the Auditor General is not a “subject” of article IV because the Auditor General is not mentioned in the text of article IV. 171 Since the Auditor General
was not a subject of article IV, the proposed initiative’s provisions relating
to the Auditor General violated article XIV, section 3. 172 The court also conclusively stated in passing that the new duties created by Independent Maps’
initiative “creates changes that neither ‘attack [n]or . . . concern the actual
structure or makeup of the legislature itself’” but then uses that assertion to
164. Id.
165. Id. ¶ 32, 63 N.E.3d at 836.
166. Id. ¶ 33, 63 N.E.3d at 836.
167. Id. ¶ 34, 63 N.E.3d at 836.
168. Id. ¶ 36, 63 N.E.3d at 837.
169. Id. ¶¶ 36–41, 63 N.E.3d at 837–38 (citing Coal. for Political Honesty v. State Bd. of Elections,
359 N.E.2d 138, 141, 144–45, 146 (Ill. 1976); Coal. for Political Honesty v. State Bd. of Elections, 415
N.E.2d 368 (Ill. 1980); Chi. Bar Ass’n v. State Bd. of Elections, 561 N.E.2d 50, 54, 55–56 (Ill. 1990);
Chi. Bar Ass’n v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 641 N.E.2d 525, 528–29 (Ill. 1994)).
170. Id. ¶ 41, 63 N.E.3d at 838.
171. Id. ¶ 42, 63 N.E.3d at 838 (“As presently constituted, article IV does not mention the ‘subject’
of the Auditor General’s office or its duties, even in passing.”).
172. Id.
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support its conclusion that the Auditor General is not a subject of article
IV. 173
After striking down the initiative, the majority concluded by addressing
Independent Maps’ third argument. In response to Independent Maps’ “policy argument” that striking down its proposed initiative would make it all but
impossible to achieve meaningful redistricting reform, the court “respectfully disagree[d].” 174 The court noted that it would not comment on the wisdom or desirability of Independent Maps’ initiative because it was not the
role of the court to do so. 175 However, the court noted—broadly and conclusively—that the Auditor General “is not the only potential nonlegislative actor capable of filling the duties outlined in its proposal” because “[c]ertainly
Illinois has other offices or individuals that are unencumbered by the limitations expressed in Article XIV.” 176
The court then stated its decision was based “solely on the constitutional
infirmity of the particular ballot initiative before [the] court” and that its decision was “not intended to reflect in any way on the viability of other possible redistricting reform initiatives.” 177 The court said that because it found
Count I of People’s Map’s complaint dispositive, it would not address any
of the other remaining issues, including both parties request that the court
determine whether any hypothetical redistricting initiative could be constitutional. 178 The court noted it would “leave that question for another day.”179
2. Dissenting Opinions
The three Republican judges—then-Chief Justice Rita B. Garman, Justice Robert R. Thomas, and Justice Lloyd A. Karmeier—each wrote dissenting opinions. 180 Chief Justice Garman wrote separately to voice her view that
redistricting is “clearly” an issue encompassed by article XIV, section 3 because redistricting is an issue where the interests of legislators naturally conflict with the people of Illinois. 181 She also cited her dissents in ColeRandazzo v. Ryan and Beaubien v. Ryan and argued, again, that the court had

173. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Coal. for Political Honesty, 359 N.E.2d at 146).
174. Id. ¶ 43, 63 N.E.3d at 838.
175. Id. ¶ 48, 63 N.E.3d at 839.
176. Id. ¶ 43, 63 N.E.3d at 838.
177. Id. ¶ 44, 63 N.E.3d at 839.
178. Id. ¶ 45, 63 N.E.3d at 839.
179. Id.
180. Id. ¶ 52, 63 N.E.3d at 840 (Garman, J., dissenting); see also id. ¶ 57, 63 N.E.3d at 840 (Thomas,
J., dissenting); id. ¶ 66, 63 N.E.3d at 841 (Karmeier, J., dissenting).
181. Id. ¶ 53, 63 N.E.3d at 840 (Garman, J., dissenting).
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a duty to ensure the redistricting process served Illinois voters and not legislators; Chief Justice Garman viewed the majority’s opinion as failing to perform that duty. 182
Justice Thomas’s dissent is notable for its fiery language. Justice
Thomas opened by stating “[t]he Illinois Constitution is meant to prevent
tyranny, not to enshrine it.” 183 Justice Thomas argued the majority’s opinion
essentially nullified the citizen ballot initiative and that the opinion should
be distributed along with “bright orange warning sticker[s] . . . reading, ‘Out
of Service’” that readers could place over article XIV, section 3 of the Illinois
Constitution. 184 Similar to Chief Justice Garman, Justice Thomas argued that
the framers intended citizen ballot initiatives to serve as a check against selfinterested legislators; he concluded by stating that “a muzzle has been placed
on the people of this State, and their voices supplanted with judicial
fiat. . . . The whimper you hear is democracy stifled.” 185
Justice Karmeier’s lengthy dissent provided a substantive analysis of
why reversal was warranted. 186 In its analysis, the dissent also identified
“two basic lines of constitutional argument”: (1) that the initiative violated
article XIV, section 3 of the Illinois Constitution because it was not limited
to structural and procedural subjects contained in article IV, and (2) that the
initiative violated article III, section 3 because it impermissibly combined
separate and unrelated questions into a single ballot initiative. 187
The dissent addressed the latter argument first. Citing Coalition II, it
stated that a ballot initiative may contain multiple questions without violating article III, section 3, so long as they “have a reasonable, workable relationship to the same subject” and are “germane to the accomplishment of a
single objective.” 188 The dissent viewed the proposed initiative as offering
one question “narrowly focused” on a single subject—redistricting; it viewed
each part of the proposal as “integrally related to that purpose and no
other.” 189 The dissent conceded that the proposed initiative touched on a
range of subjects but reasoned that initiative’s components were all “essential pieces” of a new redistricting framework, and thus, the initiative was an
182. Id. ¶¶ 54–55, 63 N.E.3d at 840.
183. Id. ¶ 58, 63 N.E.3d at 840 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
184. Id. ¶ 59, 63 N.E.3d at 840.
185. Id. ¶¶ 61–63, 63 N.E.3d at 840–41.
186. See generally id. ¶¶ 67–172, 63 N.E.3d at 841–71 (Karmeier, J., dissenting). Curiously, Justice
Karmeier’s dissent also included a full background section; while the section did not repeat the majority’s
background section verbatim, it was not materially different. Compare id. at ¶¶ 68–85, 63 N.E.3d at 841–
49, with id. ¶¶ 2–19, 63 N.E.3d at 825–32 (majority opinion).
187. Id. ¶ 88, 63 N.E.3d at 849–50 (Karmeier, J., dissenting).
188. Id. ¶ 90, 63 N.E.3d at 850.
189. Id. ¶ 91, 63 N.E.3d at 850.
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“all-in-one, take-it-or-leave-it proposition.” 190 The dissent also noted that
forcing Independent Maps to present each component as a separate ballot
question was unworkable and could result in a system “that no one wanted,
that no one had ever suggested, and that could not possibly work.”191 Finally,
the dissent noted that the current redistricting system is complex and also
touches on a range of subjects, so any meaningful reform would necessarily
reach a number of subjects. 192 Additionally, in a footnote, the dissent dismissed an argument that the proposed initiative’s deletion of the requirement
that electoral districts be “compact” also presented a separate question to
voters. The dissent found the proposed initiative’s language in subsection (a)
essentially served the same purpose as the “compact” requirement. 193
The dissent then turned to Counts I through VI of People’s Map’s complaint, the validity of which the dissent viewed as dependent on the construction of article XIV, section 3. 194 The dissent looked to the text of article XIV,
section 3, and, unlike the majority, it concluded the relevant text was ambiguous. It cited past cases interpreting article XIV, section 3 as proof of ambiguity. 195
After a brief overview of the ballot initiative in general and constitutional theory, 196 the dissent consulted proceedings of the 1970 constitutional
convention. While acknowledging that article XIV, section 3 is limited to
subjects found in article IV, 197 the dissent focused on the delegates discussion of the purpose of article XIV, section 3—namely, providing the electorate a means to amend the legislative article of the constitution where the
General Assembly would choose not to act out of their own self-interest. 198
The dissent also quoted Delegate Ray H. Garrison, a member of the convention’s finance committee, 199 who specifically mentioned establishing a redistricting commission “comprised entirely of nonlegislative members” as

190. Id. ¶ 93, 63 N.E.3d at 851.
191. Id. ¶ 94, 63 N.E.3d at 851.
192. Id. ¶ 96, 63 N.E.3d at 851–52.
193. Id. ¶ 92 n.9, 63 N.E.3d at 850 n.9.
194. Id. ¶¶ 98–100, 63 N.E.3d at 852–53.
195. Id. ¶ 101, 63 N.E.3d at 853.
196. Id. ¶¶ 102–05, 63 N.E.3d at 853–54. The dissent cited Illinois case law and sources like the
Declaration of Independence and John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government for the basic proposition
that sovereignty is derived from the governed and that the people can reserve power for themselves.
197. Id. ¶ 106, 63 N.E.3d at 854–55.
198. Id. ¶¶ 106–12, 63 N.E.3d at 854–56.
199. 1 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 35, at xxii.
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one example of a constitutional amendment legislators could never be expected to propose themselves. 200
The dissent then cited Coalition II for the proposition that the court
“must avoid unduly technical and/or restrictive constructions that would tend
to defeat [the] purpose” of article XIV, section 3, as stated by the convention’s delegates. 201 Contrary to the majority’s analysis, the dissent reviewed
the approach taken by other states in interpreting their constitution’s citizen
initiative provision 202 and concluded that when construing such a provision,
“[t]he standard is a liberal one.” 203
Using this broader standard, the dissent then turned to addressing
Counts I through VI. It began with Count V, which, again, argued the initiative violated article XIV, section 3 because it did not include structural and
procedural changes to the General Assembly. The dissent viewed this argument as alleging the proposed initiative was invalid because it did not include
a change to section 1 of article IV, which provides for the structure of the
General Assembly itself. 204 The dissent viewed this as relying on a misreading of CBA II 205 and dismissed the argument as against the plain language of
article XIV, section 3, which allowed citizen initiatives to reach structural
and procedural subjects in all of article IV. 206 The dissent also noted Count
V’s argument conflicted with the records of the convention debates, in which
Delegate Louis J. Perona noted that redistricting was not only intended to be
a matter covered by the citizen initiative but was, in fact, one of the “critical
areas” intended to be covered. 207
200. See Hooker, 2016 IL 121077, ¶ 108, 63 N.E.3d at 855 (quoting 2 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS,
supra note 35, at 584). Garrison’s remarks were given during a debate to include a citizen initiative in
section 2 of article XIV, which ultimately failed.
201. Id. ¶ 113, 63 N.E.3d at 857.
202. Id. ¶¶ 114-115, 63 N.E.3d at 857–58 (citing decisions from Oklahoma, Arizona, Nebraska,
Maine, Michigan, Hawaii, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Montana, Ohio, and Oregon).
203. Id. ¶ 115, 63 N.E.3d at 857.
204. Id. ¶ 119, 63 N.E.3d at 858–59; see also ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“The legislative power is
vested in a General Assembly consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives, elected by the
electors from 59 Legislative Districts and 118 Representative Districts.”).
205. Hooker, 2016 IL 121077, ¶ 129, 63 N.E.3d at 860–61.
206. Id. ¶¶ 120–123, 63 N.E.3d at 859–60.
207. Id. ¶ 128, 63 N.E.3d at 860; see also 4 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 35, at 2712. As
noted in the proceedings:
MR. TOMEI: So, in other words, that’s a change in—that’s a structure, a particular structure not contained in the present article but one which would be a proper subject for initiative
under this clause, that is, unicameral—
MR. PERONA: That is correct. That is the major reason that we could not limit it to certain
sections.
MR. TOMEI: All right. And would the same be true for questions of election? And I amplify that by saying that you refer to structure, size, et cetera; and under the pertinent sections
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The remaining counts, the dissent stated, alleged in various ways that
the proposed initiative was not limited to article IV. The dissent dismissed
Count II, which alleged the initiative would alter article VI by effectively
changing the circuit court’s subject matter jurisdiction, as “simply incorrect.” 208 Again, article VI grants circuit courts original jurisdiction over all
matters “except when the Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction relating to redistricting.” 209 The dissent viewed this provision as “entirely conditional.” 210 The proposed initiative’s removal of the Illinois
Supreme Court’s exclusive jurisdiction over redistricting claims would likewise merely remove the condition provided in article VI; thus, the terms of
article VI would still operate as written even if the circuit courts’ subject
matter jurisdiction was effectively expanded. 211
Similarly, the dissent dismissed Count IV as erroneous. It rejected the
claim that the proposed initiative would impose political affiliation requirements on supreme court justices. 212 The dissent noted that while political affiliation is not technically a requirement to serve on the Illinois Supreme
Court, the court has never seen an independent elected to its bench. 213 Moreover, the portion of the initiative at issue required that the chief justice and
the other justice who select the special redistricting commissioner not be
from the same political party; the court noted that the plain language did not
bar two independents or an independent and a justice affiliated with a party
from selecting a commissioner. 214 The dissent then dismissed as impossible
a scenario where all seven justices belonged to the same political party; it
also found that the possibility of such a scenario would not render the proposed initiative unconstitutional. 215
The dissent dismissed Count III’s claim that altering the supreme
court’s role in redistricting—from the court’s current role of submitting two
of this proposed article, the first grouping of them—power, structure, composition, and apportionment—you do deal with size and with elections. You deal with cumulative voting—matters
of that nature—and is that the kind of thing, also, that would be subject to initiative under this
proposed section 15?
MR. PERONA: Yes. Those are the critical areas, actually.
Id. (emphasis added).
208. Hooker, 2016 IL 121077, ¶ 133, 63 N.E.3d at 862.
209. See ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 9.
210. Hooker, 2016 IL 121077, ¶ 134, 63 N.E.3d at 862.
211. Id.
212. Id. ¶ 136, 63 N.E.3d at 862–63.
213. Id. ¶ 137, 63 N.E.3d at 863.
214. Id.
215. The dissent noted that such a scenario was an entirely different “question” than the one before
the court. This remark observes that the possibility—while a possible pitfall of the proposed framework—
did not render it unconstitutional. Id. ¶ 138, 63 N.E.3d at 863.
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names for a random drawing to the role of two justices jointly selecting a
special commissioner—was impermissible because it affects the constitution’s judicial article, a subject outside of article IV. 216 The dissent argued
that the court already plays an “integral role in the redistricting process,” and
that role is derived only from section 3 of article IV. The proposed initiative,
the dissent found, “would therefore have no spillover effects on any other
provisions of the constitution.” While the nature of the court’s role in redistricting would change, it would nevertheless remain a structural and procedural subject found in article IV. 217
The dissent employed a similar rationale in regard to Count VI. It also
found that the proposed initiative’s removal of expressly granting the Attorney General the duty to bring redistricting actions would not have an effect
past section 3 of article IV. 218 Further, the dissent viewed “[a]ssigning responsibility for who is to bring an action and specifying how it is to be styled
and where it should be filed are quintessentially procedural aspects of the
redistricting process” within the bounds of article XIV, section 3. 219
Lastly, the dissent addressed Count I, which argued the proposed initiative was invalid because the proposed role of the Auditor General was not
a subject contained in article IV. The dissent acknowledged that the Auditor
General was not mentioned in article IV; it then determined that the new role
proposed by Independent Maps would not fall under any of the Auditor General’s existing duties 220 nor would it alter any of its existing responsibilities. 221 Thus, the dissent concluded that the proposed role would create
entirely new, separate duties that would be found in section 3 of article IV,
and because the proposed role did not alter or affect the Auditor General’s
existing duties found in article VIII, the proposed initiative could not be
viewed as including a subject outside of article IV. 222 The dissent bolstered
its reasoning by considering what the majority would not. It again recited the
delegates’ concerns that a citizen initiative would be abused and found that
Independent Maps’ initiative was not “a subterfuge to alter other substantive

216. Id. ¶ 139, 63 N.E.3d at 863–64.
217. Id.
218. Id. ¶ 140, 63 N.E.3d at 864.
219. Id.
220. Id. ¶ 142, 63 N.E.3d at 865.
221. See id. ¶ 144, 63 N.E.3d at 865. The dissent did not address any of the majority’s practical
concerns concerning opportunity costs of performing the new duties in concluding that the Auditor General’s existing duties would not be altered under the proposed framework.
222. Id. ¶¶ 143–144, 63 N.E.3d at 865.
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provisions of the constitution,” i.e., the substantive provision regarding the
Auditor General. 223
Justice Karmeier closed his dissenting opinion by highlighting that the
framers acknowledged self-interest of legislators and therefore intended for
citizen initiatives to be able to amend structural and procedural subjects of
article IV, which included the structure of the redistricting commission provided in section 3. 224 He argued that the majority’s holding essentially required any redistricting initiative to keep all the “current actors” included in
section 3 of article IV; Justice Karmeier observed that “[i]f all that can be
done is rearrange the pieces, it is difficult to see how meaningful reform
could ever be accomplished.” 225 He argued that the majority’s narrow construction of article XIV, section 3 rendered citizen initiatives essentially
meaningless, which violated a basic principle of constitutional construction
to give “every word and phrase” some effect. 226 While noting that his dissent
was not meant in any way to express support for the proposed initiative, 227
Justice Karmeier criticized the majority’s assertion that some redistricting
initiative could pass constitutional muster as “an empty [promise].” 228
Finally, after the court denied Independent Maps’ motion for a rehearing, Justice Karmeier supplemented his dissent to criticize the majority for
not providing a more complete analysis which addressed the dissent’s rationale. 229 Justice Karmeier also cited City of Chicago v. Reeves, a case from
1906 concerning a constitutional amendment to the 1870 Illinois Constitution. 230 Justice Karmeier relied on the Reeves case to show that the Illinois
Supreme Court has upheld constitutional amendments that are not technically limited to one constitutional article so long as the amendment’s effects
on other articles are incidental and all changes are germane to the object of
the amendment. 231

223. Id. ¶ 145, 63 N.E.3d at 865–66.
224. Id. ¶ 146, 63 N.E.3d at 866.
225. Id. ¶ 146, 63 N.E.3d at 866.
226. Id. ¶ 147, 63 N.E.3d at 866–67.
227. Id. ¶ 153, 63 N.E.3d at 868.
228. Id. ¶ 151, 63 N.E.3d at 867.
229. Id. ¶¶ 158–61, 63 N.E.3d 824, 868–69.
230. Id. ¶¶ 161–67, 63 N.E.3d 824, 869–70.
231. Id. ¶¶ 162–64, 63 N.E.3d 824, 869–70. Reeves decided whether a proposed amendment which
included changes to more than one constitutional article violated article XIV of the 1870 constitution,
which contained materially different language than the current article XIV. City of Chicago v. Reeves,
77 N.E. 237, 237–40 (Ill. 1906).
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III. ANALYSIS
At first blush, Hooker v. Illinois State Board of Elections offers a clear
decision which settles the case on the narrowest grounds possible, apparently
following generally accepted principles of judicial restraint. 232 But the clarity
is only skin-deep. The Hooker decision further constricts article XIV, section
3 but fails, in large part, to illuminate the contours of a permissible citizen
ballot initiative. Where the majority could have harmonized its past interpretations of article XIV, section 3, it chose instead to provide very little substantive analysis. Clearly, what emerges from the majority’s decision is a
narrower construction of the citizen initiative, but the opinion creates more
questions than it answers. From a litigation perspective, the proposed initiative was far from perfect. 233 However, the majority’s reasoning muddies the
legal standards for evaluating a citizen initiative and arguably misconstrues
case law. As a result, Hooker leaves both the future of redistricting reform
and the vitality of the citizen ballot initiative uncertain.
A. Hooker’s Reasoning and its Effects
The majority’s rationale in reaching its decision is misguided because
it takes a superficially narrow view of the term “subject” found in article
XIV, section 3 and it arguably ignores the intent of the framers of the 1970
Illinois Constitution. Moreover, the opinion fails to provide much-needed
clarity, including explanation of what constitutes a “structural and procedural subject” and whether an initiative’s “material effect” on another constitutional article is enough to violate article XIV, section 3.
1. Is the Proposed Role of the Auditor General Truly a “Subject”?
In his dissent, Justice Karmeier offered a useful distillation of the majority’s reasoning: 234 the proposed initiative included a new role for the Illinois Auditor General, and this is a subject of the proposed initiative. Because
232. See, e.g., People v. White, 2011 IL 109689, ¶ 148, 956 N.E.2d 379, 414–15 (“Certainly, it is a
fundamental rule of judicial restraint that a court not reach constitutional questions in advance of the
necessity of deciding them.”); see also Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012) (acknowledging
the Supreme Court’s “usual reluctance to decide constitutional questions unnecessarily”).
233. The author did not conduct interviews with Independent Maps to gain insight into the reasoning
used in authoring the proposed initiative. The author merely observes that the proposed initiative makes
a variety of changes to the redistricting framework that invite legal challenge. See infra Section III.B.
234. Hooker, 2016 IL 121077, ¶ 161, 63 N.E.3d 824, 868–69 (“Distilled to its essence, the majority’s
position is that Independent Maps’ initiative fails to meet the article XIV, section 3 requirement that
proposed amendments ‘be limited to structural and procedural subjects contained in Article IV’ because
it assigns additional duties to the Auditor General, whose current responsibilities are set forth in a different part of the constitution, namely article VIII, section 3.” (citations omitted) (quoting ILL. CONST. art.
XIV, §3)).
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the Auditor General is not mentioned in article IV but rather is only mentioned in article VIII, the Auditor General is not a subject of article IV. Thus,
the proposed initiative was not limited to “structural and procedural subjects
contained in Article IV” and was therefore unconstitutional. 235 Although the
majority arguably alluded to other reasons that the Auditor General’s role
was impermissible under article XIV, section 3, 236 this is the only justification clearly relied upon by the majority in its decision.
Thus, a threshold question that the majority seems to ask and answer is:
what is the meaning of “subject” as it appears in article XIV, section 3? The
majority seems to answer that any provision of a proposed initiative can be
a separate and distinct “subject” within the meaning of article XIV, section
3. As the result of Hooker shows, this is an extremely narrow construction,
and the majority reaches the answer via a questionable analysis, essentially
relying on—and arguably misconstruing—the holding in CBA I.
The majority found that evaluating the proposed initiative required it to
construe the meaning of article XIV, section 3 and then found that the plain
language of section 3 was unambiguous. 237 As such, the majority said it
would not consult drafting history or convention debates to interpret section
3. 238 Interestingly, in the next breath, the majority uses its decisions in Coalition I, Coalition II, and CBA II to essentially cite the convention debates to
show that section 3 was intended to be “a very limited form of constitutional
initiative” which was only intended to reach a subset of topics—structural
and procedural subjects—in article IV. 239
To support its conclusion that the proposed initiative is not limited to
“structural and procedural subjects” of article IV, the majority then analogizes to CBA I, 240 where the court invalidated a ballot initiative which would
have required a three-fifths vote from the General Assembly on bills raising
revenue and would have created a revenue committee that was required to
hold public meetings. 241 The CBA I court found that the initiative there was
not limited to structural and procedural subjects because “[w]rapped up in
235. See id. ¶¶ 41–42, 63 N.E.3d at 838 (majority opinion); ILL. CONST. art. XIV, §3.
236. The majority also seemed to suggest that the Auditor General’s proposed role was not a structural or procedural subject. See id. ¶ 42, 63 N.E.3d at 838. Additionally, the majority seemed to note that
the actual performance of the new duties would have a “material effect” on article VIII because it would
take time away from performing the Auditor General’s duties outlined in article VIII. See id. ¶ 29, 63
N.E.3d at 835.
237. Id. ¶ 35, 63 N.E.3d at 836–37.
238. Id. ¶ 36, 63 N.E.3d at 837.
239. Id. ¶ 36, 63 N.E.3d at 837 (quoting Chi. Bar Ass’n v. State Bd. of Elections, 561 N.E.2d 50, 54
(Ill. 1990)).
240. Id. ¶¶ 40–41, 63 N.E.3d at 838.
241. Chi. Bar Ass’n, 561 N.E.2d at 52–53.
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th[e] structural and procedural package is a substantive issue not found in
article IV—the subject of increasing State revenue or increasing taxes.” 242
The Hooker majority viewed the proposed role of the Auditor General in the
same way—a subject outside article IV. This basis was used to invalidate the
proposed initiative.
However, the court’s analysis is flawed for two reasons: (1) the majority
contorts the holding in CBA I and (2) it fails to properly construe article XIV,
section 3. In regard to the first point, the ballot initiative in CBA I is entirely
distinguishable from Independent Maps’ proposed initiative. In CBA I, the
subject of the initiative was increasing state revenue and increasing taxes. 243
The initiative had aspects that covered structural and procedural subjects—
i.e., creating revenue committees and requiring the committees to hold meetings—but the central subject of the initiative was passing revenue bills. 244
The CBA I court recognized this was the type of ordinary, substantive legislation that the framers specifically wanted to be inaccessible through citizen
ballot initiative. 245 Moreover, article IX speaks directly about the General
Assembly’s ability to raise revenue, so the initiative would explicitly qualify
that article, which is, of course, outside article IV. 246 So “increasing State
revenue or increasing taxes” 247 was the substantive subject of the initiative,
and structural and procedural aspects were “wrapped” around this subject;
the court viewed this as violating article XIV, section 3 and going against the
framers’ stated purpose for the citizen ballot initiative. 248
To the contrary, the subject of Independent Maps’ proposed initiative is
redistricting, a subject found in article IV. So while the role of the Auditor
General plays a part in the proposed initiative, it is not the subject of the
initiative. This points to the second error in the majority’s reasoning.
In regard to the second point, the majority was correct in that resolving
Hooker required it interpret article XIV, section 3, but it did not address what
really needed to be interpreted—namely, what constitutes a “subject” under
article XIV, section 3. Without looking to drafting history, the majority’s
answer seems to be that every portion of a proposed initiative must be a

242. Id. at 55.
243. Id. at 52–53 (citing the proposed amendment which added an entirely new section entitled “Passage of Revenue Bills”).
244. See id.
245. Id. at 55–56.
246. See ILL. CONST. art IX, § 1 (“The General Assembly has the exclusive power to raise revenue
by law except as limited or otherwise provided in this Constitution. The power of taxation shall not be
surrendered, suspended, or contracted away.”).
247. Chi. Bar Ass’n, 561 N.E.2d at 55.
248. Id. at 56–57.
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“subject” of article IV. This is a very limiting view; if the majority had honestly looked to the drafting history of article XIV, section 3, they would have
had a difficult time harmonizing their construction with the delegates’ comments.
The framers of the 1970 constitution seemed to have a wider view of
the term “subject,” which could include subjects not yet in the legislative
article. When asked what sort of subjects were contemplated as being within
the purview of the citizen initiative, Delegate Louis J. Perona made it clear
that the initiative was not limited “just to those things presently contained in
the legislative article”; instead, Delegate Perona stated that the authors intended it to reach anything in the “legislative setup”—i.e., anything concerning a structural and procedural subject of article IV—even if that included
something that was not then in the legislative article. 249 This seems to support
Justice Karmeier’s view on the Auditor General’s duties expressed in his
dissent. 250 So long as the Auditor General’s proposed role (1) related to redistricting and (2) did not fall under or alter any of the office’s existing duties, the framers viewed it as fair game for a ballot initiative.
Given the views of the framers and the holding in CBA I, it seems that
merely mentioning the Auditor General in the proposed initiative should not
be enough to deem the Auditor General a “subject” of the initiative.
2. “Material Effect” and What Constitutes a “Structural and Procedural Subject”—Muddying the Waters
For any redistricting reformers with plans to go back to the drafting table, two other points in the majority opinion seem to muddy the waters. The
majority alluded to the Auditor General’s proposed role as having a “material
effect” on article VIII, which, on its own, appeared to be enough to violate
article XIV, section 3. 251 Moreover, the majority also seemed to suggest that

249. See 4 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 35, at 2711. As noted in the proceedings:
MR. TOMEI: Thank you, Mr. Vice-President. I had a question for Delegate Perona on the
language of this proposal. With respect to this limitation, that I think has just been discussed,
on structural and procedural subjects contained in this article, I take it it is not the intention of
the committee to limit the initiative just to those things presently contained in the legislative
article.
MR. PERONA: Yes. That’s correct. We—that’s the problem. If you get too specific with
the limitation, you inhibit the possibility of change within the legislative setup . . . .
Id.
250. Hooker v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 2016 IL 121077, ¶ 142–44, 63 N.E.3d 824, 865 (Karmeier,
J., dissenting).
251. Id. ¶ 29, 63 N.E.3d at 835 (majority opinion).
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the Auditor General’s proposed role was not a “structural or procedural subject” as required by article XIV. 252 These points seem to cloud the standards
used by the court to address the validity of a ballot initiative. The majority
had the opportunity to clarify these standards, but instead, it seemed to inject
more uncertainty.
As to the first point, the majority seemed to address the real-world concerns raised by People’s Map in regard to the Auditor General’s proposed
role. As the court noted, People’s Map argued that the proposed role would
require “extensive screening steps and applicant interviews to ensure compliance with the criteria established in the initiative for members of the Applicant Review Panel.” 253 This prediction is undoubtedly true, and the
majority acknowledged it. The majority viewed the role as “requir[ing] considerable effort, time, and expense.” 254 Performing these duties, it noted,
would necessarily mean the Auditor General would not have time to perform
the already-existing duties under article VIII: “That alteration in the duties
of the Auditor General, in itself, has a material effect on another section of
our constitution, in violation of article XIV, section 3.” 255 While the majority
does not rely on this point to reach its decision, it is unclear whether it created
this practical test and will apply it to future ballot initiatives. As such, future
drafters face uncertainty in the court’s standards.
As to the second point, the majority confusingly seemed to reference
the “structural and procedural” requirement, apparently concluding that the
Auditor General’s proposed role did not meet it. Without analysis, the majority conclusively stated “the additional duties the ballot initiative imposes
on the Auditor General creates changes that neither ‘attack [n]or . . . concern
the actual structure or makeup of the legislature itself.’” 256 Confusingly, the
majority seemed to use this in support of its analysis that the ballot initiative
was not limited to subjects in article IV. 257 This conclusive, throwaway line

252. Id. ¶ 42, 63 N.E.3d at 838.
253. Id. ¶ 28, 63 N.E.3d at 835.
254. Id. ¶ 29, 63 N.E.3d at 835 (“First, winnowing the number of applicants statewide down to a
pool of 30 reviewers is likely to be a time-consuming and resource-intensive task. Indeed, the mandate
that the Auditor General evaluate the ‘ethical conduct’ and partisan leanings of ‘each applicant’ who
applies from across the state is likely to require considerable effort, time, and expense.”).
255. Id.
256. Id. ¶ 42, 63 N.E.3d at 838 (alterations in original) (quoting Coal. for Political Honesty v. State
Bd. of Elections, 359 N.E.2d 138, 146 (1976)).
257. Id. (“Therefore, the duties of the Auditor General have never been and are not now a ‘subject
contained in Article IV’ as currently constituted. Thus, that provision is not a proper ‘subject’ of the
legislative article, in violation of the limitation in article XIV, section 3.”).
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of the majority’s opinion highlights another major gap in the case law concerning citizen ballot initiatives: has the court fully defined what a “structural
and procedural subject” is?
At least one court has noted the dearth of explanation as to what constitutes a “structural and procedural subject.” 258 The closest the Illinois Supreme Court has come to explaining a “structural and procedural subject”
was in CBA II in the context of a ballot initiative proposing term limits. In
rejecting the initiative, the court found that it did not address structural or
procedural subjects in article IV. 259 The court stated that term limits were not
structural because they did not address “the structure of the legislature as an
institution”—it would remain a bicameral legislature with the same number
of members; likewise, it found term limits were not procedural because they
would not change the “process by which the General Assembly adopts a
law.” 260 The First District followed this narrow definition in Clark v. Illinois
State Board of Elections when it struck down another term limits initiative. 261 Further, this narrow view of a “structural and procedural subject” was
also given in Lousin v. State Board of Elections, twelve years before CBA II.
In Lousin, the First District stated simply: “An amendment is structural and
procedural if it relates to the structure, and, of necessity, incidentally affects
the procedure of the General Assembly.” 262
The Hooker majority seems to echo this definition in bolstering its findings that the Auditor General’s proposed role violates article XIV, section 3.
This definition seems to exclude redistricting altogether because it does not
affect the literal structure of the General Assembly or the process by which
it passes laws. However, this narrow definition of “structural and procedural
subject” is troublesome for two reasons: (1) it seems to exclude redistricting
altogether, thereby conflicting with the plain meaning of article XIV, section
3 and (2) it runs contrary to the framers’ stated intentions.

258. See Clark v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, No. 14 CH 07356, slip op. at 6 (Ill. Cir. Ct. June 27,
2014) (noting that Coalition II—the one case to uphold a ballot initiative—“contains no discussion of
what was substantive or procedural”).
259. Chi. Bar Ass’n v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 641 N.E.2d 525, 528–29 (Ill. 1994).
260. Id. at 529 (“The eligibility or qualifications of an individual legislator does not involve the
structure of the legislature as an institution. The General Assembly would remain a bicameral legislature
consisting of a House and Senate with a total of 177 members, and would maintain the same organization.
Likewise, the eligibility or qualifications of an individual legislator does not involve any of the General
Assembly’s procedures. The process by which the General Assembly adopts a law would remain unchanged.”).
261. See Clark v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 2014 IL App (1st) 141937, ¶ 24, 17 N.E.3d 771, 778.
262. Lousin v. State Bd. of Elections, 438 N.E.2d 1241, 1246 (Ill. 1982).
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The first point is straightforward. Article XIV, section 3 states that
“[a]mendments shall be limited to structural and procedural subjects contained in Article IV.” 263 A subject of article IV is certainly redistricting,
which is provided for in section 3. The redistricting process has a structural
component; 264 the redistricting commission is made up of eight members
and, at times, a ninth member. The process also, quite obviously, has procedural components. The entire process laid out in section 3 of article IV is a
procedure. 265 Thus, under the plain meaning of phrase, redistricting is a
“structural and procedural subject.”
Moreover, the convention debates—as pointed out in Karmeier’s dissent 266—seem to reject this narrow definition of “structural and procedural
subject” by explicitly mentioning redistricting in discussing article XIV, section 3. Delegate Ray H. Garrison, in discussing the role of the citizen ballot
initiative, cited an independent redistricting commission as the type of
change legislators could never be expected to enact due to self-interest. 267
More directly, an exchange between Delegate Perona and Delegate Peter A.
Tomei show that citizen initiatives were intended to reach redistricting:
MR. TOMEI: So, in other words, that’s a change in— that’s a structure, a particular structure not contained in the present article but one
which would be a proper subject for initiative under this clause, that is,
unicameral—
MR. PERONA: That is correct. That is the major reason that we
could not limit it to certain sections.
MR. TOMEI: All right. And would the same be true for questions of
election? And I amplify that by saying that you refer to structure, size, et
cetera; and under the pertinent sections of this proposed article, the first
grouping of them—power, structure, composition, and apportionment—
you do deal with size and with elections. You deal with cumulative voting—matters of that nature—and is that the kind of thing, also, that would
be subject to initiative under this proposed section 15?
MR. PERONA: Yes. Those are the critical areas, actually. 268

263. ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3.
264. See Structure, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/structure
[http://perma.cc/QMY4-NJ3K] (“[S]omething arranged in a definite pattern of organization.”)
265. See Procedure, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/procedure
[http://perma.cc/M35V-7VFW] (“[A] series of steps followed in a regular definite order.”).
266. See Hooker v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 2016 IL 121077, ¶ 128, 63 N.E.3d 824, 860 (Karmeier,
J., dissenting).
267. See 2 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 35, at 584. Garrison’s remarks were given during
a debate to include a citizen initiative in section 2 of article XIV, which ultimately failed.
268. See 4 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 35, at 2712 (emphasis added).
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As the trial court in Hooker observed, for the 1970 delegates, the term “apportionment” was synonymous with “redistricting.” 269 The above exchange
and Delegate Garrison’s comments show that the framers intended for the
citizen initiative to address redistricting, so a definition of “structural and
procedural subject” that excludes redistricting would run contrary to their
intentions.
Despite the plain meaning of article XIV, section 3 and relevant drafting
history, the Hooker majority bolstered its conclusion with the assertion that
the Auditor General’s proposed role violated article XIV, section 3 because
it created “changes that neither ‘attack [n]or . . . concern the actual structure
or makeup of the legislature itself.’” 270 This seems to adopt the reasoning of
CBA II rather than qualify it, and such a reading severely limits the reach of
permissible citizen initiatives. Both this point in the majority’s opinion and
the point concerning the “material effect” of a proposed initiative create uncertainty when it comes to permissible ballot initiatives. As such, both points
present more questions that the Illinois Supreme Court will eventually have
to answer.
3. Future of Redistricting Reform and Citizen Ballot Initiatives
The future of redistricting reform and citizen ballot initiatives looks
dimmer after Hooker. The majority’s opinion reigns in what was already a
narrow opening for permissible citizen initiatives. Further, in ignoring
Karmeier’s call for a response to his dissent, 271 the majority has left future
groups pushing redistricting reform to essentially guess at what legal standards will be applied when their ballot initiatives are inevitably challenged.
In regard to a redistricting initiative in particular, the majority very
clearly left the door open. It declined to address whether any hypothetical
redistricting initiative would pass constitutional muster, stating it would
“leave that question for another day.” 272 However, the majority seemed to
imply such an initiative was possible:
Independent Maps makes the policy argument that upholding the circuit
court’s finding that the plaintiffs were entitled to judgment on the pleadings will “make it largely impossible to make meaningful reforms in the
redistricting process.” We respectfully disagree. The Auditor General is

269. See Hooker v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, No. 16 CH 6539, 2016 WL 4581493, at *14 (Ill. Cir.
Ct. July 20, 2016); see also 6 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 35, at 1298–99.
270. Hooker, 2016 IL 121077, ¶ 42, 63 N.E.3d at 838 (majority opinion) (alterations in original)
(quoting Coal. for Political Honesty v. State Bd. of Elections, 359 N.E.2d 138, 146 (1976)).
271. Id. ¶¶ 160–61, 63 N.E.3d at 868–69 (Karmeier, J., dissenting).
272. Id. ¶ 45, 63 N.E.3d at 839 (majority opinion).
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not the only potential nonlegislative actor capable of filling the duties outlined in its proposal. Certainly Illinois has other offices or individuals that
are unencumbered by the limitations expressed in Article XIV. Indeed, the
scheme proffered in the instant proposal is not the only model of redistricting reform that could be imagined. The constitutional right of the citizens of this state to alter the legislative article by ballot initiative is not
tied to any particular plan, and we trust that the constitutional confines
of article XIV, section 3, are sufficiently broad to encompass more than
one potential redistricting scheme. 273

But time will tell if the majority’s statement rings hollow. The Hooker majority leaves unclear whether a valid initiative could only include nonlegislative actors already found in article IV or whether an entirely new actor
could be created. As to the former, the Illinois Secretary of State, Attorney
General, supreme court and governor are technically the only options.274
None of these are ideal, and if the “material effect” consideration is indeed
enough to invalidate a proposed initiative, then none of these options would
likely work. As to the possibility of an entirely new nonlegislative actor, the
specter of compensating such an official may be enough to violate article
XIV, section 3.
As unlikely as a redistricting initiative looks after Hooker, it remains
the reformer’s best hope for change in the near future. 275 In the wake of
Hooker, Governor Bruce Rauner urged the General Assembly to place the
redistricting question on the ballot. 276 That did not happen, and although relations between the General Assembly’s leadership and Governor Rauner is
acrimonious to say the least, the prospect of a future governor making the
pitch successfully is doubtful. Likewise, Illinois voters will not have the
chance to compel the General Assembly to hold another constitutional convention until 2028. 277

273. Id. ¶ 43, 63 N.E.3d at 838.
274. See ILL. CONST. art. IV.
275. Again, the only other means of amending the constitution are through a constitutional convention or through an amendment passed by the General Assembly and then ratified by voters. See ILL.
CONST. art. XIV.
276. See Tom Schuba, NBC 5 Exclusive: Rauner Pushes Redistricting Reform, Term Limits, NBC 5
CHI. (Aug. 30, 2016, 1:15 PM), https://www.nbcchicago.com/blogs/ward-room/Rauner-Pushes-Redistricting-Reform-Despite-Illinois-Supreme-Court-Ruling-391765171.html
[http://perma.cc/72MRMR3W].
277. ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 1. Section 1 of article XIV does require a ballot initiative calling for a
constitutional convention to be submitted to voters in a general election at least every twenty years. The
most recent ballot initiative calling for a convention failed in 2008, meaning that Illinois voters will not
be presented with the choice again until 2028 unless the General Assembly takes action. Constitution of
the State of Illinois: Amendments and Conventions Proposed, supra note 15.
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However, popular support for removing the General Assembly from redistricting continues to rise. 278 And the three, separate attempts to get a redistricting reform initiative on the ballot since 2010 evidence the fact that
reformers will not easily quit. 279 As Justice Thomas noted in his dissent in
Hooker, “[i]n Illinois, as throughout the United States, there is a palpable
sense of frustration by voters of every political affiliation that self-perpetuating institutions of government have excluded them from meaningful participation in the political process.” 280 Though “palpable frustration” may
spur action, Hooker created a smaller window for change to Illinois’s redistricting process.
B. Brief Observations on Independent Maps’ Proposed Initiative
Although any meaningful analysis of the proposed initiative’s potential
effectiveness is outside the scope of this Note, the author wishes to make
some observations about Independent Maps’ proposed framework in the
hopes of adding to the public’s general discussion on redistricting reform.
The proposed aim of the Independent Maps’ initiative is to “establish a
non-partisan, independent commission responsible for drawing state legislative districts in a way that is transparent and open to the public.” 281 The group
contends that creating an independent redistricting commission would, in
general, promote competitive elections and incentivize lawmakers to serve
their constituents rather than serve the interests of their respective political
parties. 282 The proposed framework would undoubtedly increase transparency in the redistricting process; it mandates that the redistricting commission hold public meetings and make its work public whereas the current
278. See Press Release, S. Ill. Univ. Paul Simon Pub. Policy Inst., Gas Tax “Lockbox,” Term Limits
and Independent Redistricting Draw Big Support (Oct. 5, 2016), http://paulsimoninstitute.siu.edu/_common/documents/opinion-polling/simon-institute-poll/2016/oct-5-psppi-simon-poll-gas-tax.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FD3T-EDTL] (noting that poll of likely voters found that about seventy-two percent
favor independent redistricting commission where about fifty-three percent supported such a commission
in 2010); see also Editorial, Independent Map Amendment’s Moment of Truth, CHI. TRIB. (July 19, 2016,
5:00 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/editorials/ct-remap-amendment-illinois-madigan-larsen-0720-jm-20160719-story.html [http://perma.cc/W5C7-5PLX] (“In poll after poll after poll, Illinois voters have supported such a change [to the redistricting process] . . . .”).
279. See generally Hooker v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 2016 IL 121077, 63 N.E.3d 824 (addressing
a proposed redistricting initiative for the 2016 general election); Clark v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, No.
14 CH 07356 (Ill. Cir. Ct. June 27, 2014) (addressing a proposed redistricting initiative for the 2014
general election). See also Editorial, supra note 22 (noting 2010 citizen initiative entitled “Illinois Fair
Map Amendment” that would modify redistricting framework to eliminate tie-breaking provision).
280. Hooker, 2016 IL 121077, ¶ 60, 63 N.E.3d at 840 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
281. See Support Indep. Maps, The Independent Map Amendment Explained, WTTW CHI. PUB.
MEDIA, https://chicagotonight.wttw.com/sites/default/files/article/file-attachments/amendment_explanation.pdf [https://perma.cc/QZA5-4LNZ].
282. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 12.
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framework has no similar provision. 283 Such a change is laudable, with the
benefits of increased transparency being self-evident. The proposed framework, however, would not give rise to a truly non-partisan redistricting commission.
While the proposed framework would require that at least seven members of the redistricting commission have no political affiliation, it would not
remove the General Assembly from the redistricting process altogether. 284
The proposed initiative would allow the Speaker of the Illinois House of
Representatives, the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives, the
Illinois Senate President, and the Senate Minority Leader to each select one
commissioner from the pool of applicants gathered and vetted by the state’s
Auditor General. 285 The initiative would also allow these party leaders to
exercise a sort of preemptive challenge in the process; each leader would
have the ability to remove five applicants from the pool of potential commissioners. 286
Additionally, the proposed framework would curiously require that the
committee have four members who are affiliated with a political party—two
members affiliated with the Democratic party and two members affiliated
with the Republican party. Thus, the redistricting commission would not
technically be non-partisan. 287 Moreover, it should be noted that although the
Auditor General is not a member of the General Assembly, he or she is appointed by the General Assembly. 288 As such, in reality, the Auditor General
may not be the non-partisan actor that some redistricting reformers imagine. 289 While it is likely impossible—especially in the wake of the Hooker
decision—to create a completely non-partisan independent redistricting
commission, the proposed framework explicitly reserves a continued role,
albeit a far more limited one, for members of the General Assembly in redistricting.

283. Compare 2016 Illinois Independent Redistricting Amendment, supra note 71 (subsections e–f),
with ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
284. See 2016 Illinois Independent Redistricting Amendment, supra note 71 (subsection d).
285. Id. (subsection d).
286. Id. (subsection d).
287. Id. (subsection d).
288. See ILL. CONST. art. VIII, § 3.
289. See generally Editorial, Bow Out, Auditor General Mautino: A Top Finance Watchdog Won’t
Turn over His Own Financial Records, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 27, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/editorials/ct-auditor-general-mautino-madigan-investigation-edit-1227-md20161227-story.html [http://perma.cc/UB9B-ZXDN] (noting that the then-Auditor General was a partisan appointee who served as a member of the General Assembly for more than twenty years).

2018]

HOOKER vs. ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS

941

Another drawback to the framework apparent on the face of Independent Maps’ proposed initiative is that it employs vague or questionable standards that would undoubtedly require litigation to construe. These standards
are found throughout the proposed framework and include, for example, the
language requiring that any redistricting plan not favor or discriminate
against any political group or person, or the language setting out criteria that
party leaders must use to select their respective commissioners. 290 Other
questions may also naturally arise from the proposed framework, such as
something as simple as: How is one deemed to be “affiliated” with a certain
political party?
These issues notwithstanding, Independent Maps’ proposed framework
would undoubtedly make progress in removing legislators from the mapmaking process and thereby curb the practice of gerrymandering. While no
framework can be perfect, the one proposed by Independent Maps would
have certainly satisfied some redistricting reformers. However, it is notable
that, given Independent Maps’ stated purpose, the proposed amendment
would not completely remove lawmakers from the redistricting process.
CONCLUSION
Illinois’s case law concerning article XIV, section 3 has been marked
by limited analysis, but it has undoubtedly moved in one direction: constricting the citizen ballot initiative. Hooker v. Illinois State Board of Elections is
yet another step in reigning in the ability of the public to directly amend the
constitution. Where existing case law was unclear concerning article XIV,
section 3, Hooker did not offer clarity but rather muddied the waters. It remains unclear what a “structural and procedural subject” is, and Hooker arguably injects another layer of analysis, i.e., whether an initiative would have
a “material effect” on another constitutional provision outside article IV. Answers—including an answer to the majority’s “question for another day”—
will likely take years, millions of dollars, and a lot of work. Moreover, those
seeking redistricting reform will be working in the dark, unable to know if
all their effort is for nothing.

290. See 2016 Illinois Independent Redistricting Amendment, supra note 71 (subsections a, d).

